Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 14 | Number 1

Article 2

Winter 2018

Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations:
Importance, Compliance, and Recommendations
Maxime Verheyden

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Maxime Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and Recommendations, 14 Hastings Bus. L.J. 37
(2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol14/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations:
Importance, Compliance, and
Recommendations
*

Maxime Verheyden†

INTRODUCTION
Social entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly popular.1 Social
enterprises commit to a social and or environmental purpose as a second
master besides shareholders.2 There is a growing demand of consumers,
investors and employees for such enterprises.3 The legal world reacted with
frenetic legislative activity, resulting in new legal entities to accommodate
these social enterprises.

* An earlier draft of this article won the Victor Brudney Prize, established by the Program on
Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School and awarded to the best student paper on a topic related
to corporate governance.
† LL.M., 2017, Harvard University. I would like to thank Professor Reinier Kraakman for his
guidance and support
1. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV 1, 26 n.115 (2012) (mentioning the plethora of media articles,
and business and law school programs and other clinics related to this topic).
2. The terms “social enterprise,” and “social entrepreneurship” will, for the purposes of this paper,
mean enterprises with such a double purpose of (i) pursuing profit generation (ii) pursuing a social and
or environmental purpose. Legal scholars have used similar definitions, see, e.g., Murray, Master, supra
note 1, at 4 n.4; Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate
Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 269 (2013).
3. See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
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One of these new entities,4 the benefit corporation, exists in thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia,5 and legislation is also under review in a
handful of other states.6 Although the different state statutes are far from
identical, there are some common characteristics. All states provide for (i) a
broader corporate purpose,7 (ii) an expanded fiduciary duty encompassing
non-shareholder interests,8 and (iii) a framework for reporting about social
and environmental achievements.9
It is precisely this broader corporate purpose and expanded fiduciary
duty in for profit companies that fundamentally innovate American corporate
law.10 The purpose of the benefit corporation statutes is ambitious:
Accommodating social entrepreneurship in a special legal entity and giving
social entrepreneurs the opportunity to use this legal entity as a way to signal
to consumers, investors, and employees that they are genuinely doing
business in a responsible manner.11 This ambitious purpose and the effect of
a state-sanctioned corporate responsibility label makes accountability
pivotal. The state legislators have opted for a “transparency-based
accountability” model12 thereby making the periodic reporting requirement
of crucial importance.

4. This includes the low-profit limited liability company, available in eight states, the flexible
purpose corporation in California and the social purpose corporation in Washington and Florida. See
generally Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER (for a state-by-state overview of the available
alternatives for benefit corporations), http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps [https://perma.cc/N6H8R4TX]; Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 22–24 (describing these corporate entities and the differences
with benefit corporations in more detail).
5. See infra Appendix I for a table of all states that have enacted benefit corporation legislation.
A number of states have seen benefit corporation legislation fail: See Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
LAW TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
6. See Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last
visited Apr. 19, 2017).
7. See infra note 66 for a description of the way this broader purpose is defined in the different
states.
8. Note that there is no fiduciary duty towards these non-shareholders; see infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
9. William H. Clark Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838–839 (2013); Jessica Chu, Filling
a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CALIF.
INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 161–162 (2012); Kennan El Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM.
U. L. REV. 151, 153 (2015); Vanisha Sukdeo, What is the Benefit of a ‘Benefit Corporation’? Examining
the Advantages and Detriment, 31 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 89, 91 (2011).
10. See infra notes 89–108 and accompanying text for a description of the liability regime for
violations of these expanded fiduciary duties.
11. See infra notes 35–62 and accompanying text.
12. The credits for coining this term in this context go to Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations:
How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Good, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 595 (2012).
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However, in his early report on reporting compliance, Dr. Haskell
Murray found a problematically low reporting rate, between eight and ten
percent.13 In this paper, I expand the data on benefit reporting, by analyzing
reporting rates in Oregon, Colorado, Minnesota and Delaware. By crossing
these results with other variables,14 I test some of the potential reasons
suggested as causes of the low reporting rate,15 and I test other reasons which
have not yet been suggested in the literature.16 This results in a thorough
understanding of the parameters influencing the benefit corporations’
reporting. Based on these parameters, I provide recommendations to state
legislators.17 These recommendations do not only target states with benefit
corporation statutes, whose public reporting provisions are summarized in
Appendix I. The recommendations also target states where benefit
corporation legislation is under review.18 The data I have accumulated and
the recommendations I make should enable these legislators to make more
informed decisions about public reporting.
For instance, two of the three benefit corporation statutes that entered
into force in 2017 lack an obligation to publish the benefit report and all three
statutes lack enforcement mechanisms backing the reporting duties of the
benefit corporations.19 In light of the importance given to accountability by
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes and the fact that the
overwhelming majority of states still mandate publication,20 this paper first
thoroughly analyzes the importance of public reporting from a theoretical
point of view.
Empirically, this paper also aims to add to the limited available data
about benefit corporations. Since the adoption of the first statute in 2010,21
13. J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA L. REV. 25, 34–35 (2015)
(suggesting different reasons for the low reporting, without testing them statistically).
14. Third-party certification, headquarters, size, principal place of business and corporate age.
15. See e.g., Murray, Benefit Reports, supra note 13.
16. For instance, I cross the results in terms of third-party certification with the reporting rates.
17. Note that Italy has also adopted a benefit corporation statute that is very similar to the MBCL
and mandates an annual report that has to be placed on the website, if a “Societa benefit” has one, see L.
28 dicembre 2015, n. 208, G.U. Dec. 30, 2015, n. 302 (It.), art. 376–84. Similar legislation has also been
adopted in Puerto Rico, creating the “Corporacion de Beneficio Social” and the “Compania de
Responsabilidad Limitada con Fin Social.” See P.R. LAWS AN. tit. 14, § 4071–4084 (2016) for the
corporation (requiring annual filing of a benefit report with a state agency). B Lab states that legislation
is on its way in Australia, Argentina, Chile, Canada and Colombia as well. International Legislation, B
LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/international-legislation [https://perma.cc/QM6R-TVHW]. In that sense, this
paper’s findings may also be interesting for foreign legislators considering enacting similar legislation.
18. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Appendix I.
20. See infra note 69 and Appendix I.
21. The first state to adopt a benefit corporation statute was Maryland; see MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2016).
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there is still a scarcity of information about the firms that incorporate as, or
convert to, benefit corporations,22 why they do so,23 and whether they comply
with the legal requirements.24 Moreover, a comparison of voluntary
reporting in Delaware and of compliance in the mandatory systems in
Oregon, Colorado, and Minnesota will add to the literature about the
usefulness of mandatory legal rules and mandatory disclosure.
One of the reasons for the lack of information about benefit corporations
— besides their recent inception — is the fact that they are almost
exclusively private companies.25 This implies a natural limitation with
regard to the depth and the uniformity of the gathered information.
Before describing the structure of this paper, it is important to make a
terminological clarification. While B Lab26 used the name “benefit
corporation” in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL) it
drafted and promoted, state legislators have used different names. For
instance, Delaware uses “public benefit corporation,” whereas Oregon uses
“benefit company.”27 In this paper, I will use the term “benefit corporations”
when referring to all the entities that have the three characteristics mentioned

22. A study which partially analyzes this is Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit
Corporation 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?. 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247–280 (2014). My study is
useful to complement this study, which (i) only analyzed Delaware public benefit corporations (ii) only
analyzed corporations that became public benefit corporations within 30 days after the statute’s entry into
force (i.e., early adopters) (iii) did not analyze third-party certification, size and principal place of
business.
23. See generally Megan Burkhart et al., Conference Report, The State of Social Enterprise:
Maryland, (an early survey limited to Maryland about these motives) https://www.slideshare.
net/changematters/maryland-benefit-corporations-analysis-full-report [https://perma.cc/U592-FHEU];
Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing
the motives of a sample of 25 benefit corporations), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848617.
24. See Murray, Benefit Reports, supra note 13 (analyzing benefit reporting in Virginia, Hawaii,
California and New York).
25. The only exception is Laureate Education, a Delaware public benefit corporation listed on
Nasdaq since February 1, 2017. Etsy Inc., a company listed on Nasdaq was a benefit corporation until
2017. It decided not to apply for recertification when it faced the obligation to convert to a public benefit
corporation. See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/
business/etsy-josh-silverman.html [https://perma.cc/6WMJ-89PH]. About the dilemma which faced Etsy
Inc. Alicia Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89,
109 n.96 (2015).
26. B Lab is a nonprofit that, for the purposes of this paper has played an important role in the
benefit corporation movement by fulfilling three roles: (i) It is the market leader in corporate social
responsibility certification amongst benefit corporations, (ii) has actively promoted the adoption of
benefit corporation statutes (see infra note 31) and (iii) it has developed the most used third-party standard
used by benefit corporations in their periodic reports (B Impact Assessment) (see infra note 305 and
accompanying text). See also About B Lab¸ B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/
about-b-lab [https://perma.cc/6WRU-DBYM].
27. See Appendix I for an overview of the benefit corporation names.
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above.28
Benefit corporations have to be distinguished from B
Corporations,29 which are companies that have been certified by B Lab.30
A final preliminary comment concerns the rationale and motives for
benefit corporation legislation. While I do devote a substantial part of my
article to an analysis of the motives that drove state legislators to adopt the
statutes, this analysis does not necessarily imply an endorsement of these
motives. Rather, I intend to take the existence of benefit corporations in the
majority of states as a given and show how crucially important public
reporting is, given the legislators’ intentions.
In Part I, I analyze why public reporting is crucial for benefit
corporations. After a discussion of the motives leading to the adoption of
benefit corporation statutes, I argue that accountability is crucial to reach the
statutes’ goals. I then explain why public reporting is necessary for
accountability and why it could also be considered as a separate goal.
Finally, I analyze why I believe that the benefits of imposing public reporting
outweigh the costs, and I briefly discuss enforcement of such a publicreporting requirement. In Part II, I analyze benefit reporting data in Oregon,
Colorado, Minnesota and Delaware and analyze some potential explanations
for the low reporting levels. In Part III, based on these results, I make some
recommendations to enhance the reporting system in a way that strikes a
balance between the need for transparency and the practical reality as shown
by the data.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC REPORTING
A. THE TRANSPARENCY-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM.
1. Analysis of the Motives: Accountability is Crucial.
In this section, I first reconstrue the common motives leading to the
28. I will use the different and specific terms, such as benefit company and public benefit
corporation when discussing specific states’ legal entities. A list of benefit corporation and company
legislation is included in Appendix I.
29. This is a very important distinction, which is not always strictly respected in practice. For
instance, benefit corporations often appear to be confused about the name of the legal structure they have
adopted.
30. To become a certified B Corporation for two years, companies have to meet minimum
performance requirement of 80 points (out of 200) on the B Impact Assessment test, meet legal
requirements (which in some states, includes conversion to the benefit corporation status), take part in a
yearly auditing of ten percent of the B Corporations, and finally pay a fee that ranges from $500 to
$50,000 depending on annual sales levels. See Make it Official, B LAB, https://www.bcorporatio
n.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official-2 [https://perma.cc/6GYG-U8WK].
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adoption of benefit corporation statutes. I analyze the legislative documents
in all of the states discussed in Part II, as well as documents issued by B
Lab,31 the drafter of MBCL,32 and other different relevant actors.33 The
motives expressed by these sources combine three factors: A growing
demand for socially and environmentally responsible enterprises, legal
obstacles hindering social enterprises, and the goal of countering
greenwashing.34 Thereafter, I discuss the raison d’être of benefit corporation
statutes and why public reporting is crucial for these statutes to reach their
goals.
a. Growing Demand for Socially and Environmentally
Responsible Enterprises by Investors, Employees, Consumers,
and Entrepreneurs.
The first factor leading to the adoption of benefit corporation legislation
is the increased demand for socially and environmentally responsible
businesses by different groups: investors, consumers, and employees.35
Proponents systematically refer to the growing market for socially
responsible investing.36 Furthermore, they invoke the impact of the social
31. B Lab has sponsored some of the benefit corporation bills. See Be the Change Oregon Steering
Committee, Oregon Benefit Company Backgrounder, B LAB, 7 (Feb. 22, 2013) (listing B Lab as initial
sponsor for bill), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/10835
[https://perma.cc/7UEJ-UKYV]; Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361 Before the Assemb. Judiciary
Comm., 2011–12 Leg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2011) (disclosing B Lab sponsorship of California bill).
32. William Clark drafted the MBCL, Benefit Corporation, The Model Legislation, B LAB (Apr. 9,
2017), http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation [https://perma.cc/2NAB-CNWE]. He also acted
as one of the initial draftsmen of the Oregon benefit company statute. His fellow draftsmen were Oregon
corporate lawyers gathered in an Oregon Corporate Lawyers’ Committee. See Be the Change Oregon
Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 6.
33. These actors include the governor of Delaware at the time of the adoption of the statute and
members of the different committees involved in the drafting and the preparation of the legislation.
34. Nonetheless, an underlying motive of some proponents of benefit corporation legislation is even
more ambitious: Starting a movement to influence all corporations to act not only in the interests of
shareholders, but also of other stakeholders. B Lab may well focus on social enterprises on most of its
webpages, but on its page for donations, one can read: “With your contribution, you help us create a world
in which one day all companies will compete not just to be the best in the world, but to be the best FOR
the world.” Help build a global movement to redefine success in business, B LAB https://donatenow.
networkforgood.org/BtheChange [https://perma.cc/JPA2-F46L]. See also Leo E. Strine Jr., Making it
Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV, 235, 253 (2014).
35. Proponents also mention entrepreneurs, but they are discussed in the next paragraph because I
consider them representative of the supply side of the market for social enterprises.
36. See Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31; see also D. J. Vogt, Legislative
Director, The Oregon Business Association (OBA) Supports House Bill 2296, OR. BUS. ASS’N (Mar. 18,
2013) (testimony before the Or. H. Comm. on Bus. & Lab.); and Justin Delaney, Vice President and
Associate Counsel, Statement of Support for HB 2296-3, STANDARD INS. CO. (Mar. 18, 2013) (testimony
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and environmental responsibility of businesses on consumers’ choices.37 A
very similar argument is made about employees. Employees, proponents
argue, are more willing to work for socially and environmentally responsible
companies.38
The increasing demand for socially and environmentally responsible
enterprises does not necessarily call for legal intervention. If the supply side
adapts to the growing demand, the market equilibrium will change and the
quantity of social enterprises will rise. In this scenario, the supply side
consists of entrepreneurs willing to create social impact in a profitable way.
The proponents argue that a large number of entrepreneurs want to create
such social enterprises.39
Creating a nonprofit is not the most suitable option for many of these
entrepreneurs.
First, the nondistribution constraint40 implies the
impossibility of raising equity capital and difficulties securing debt
financing,41 and might deter talented entrepreneurs from starting a social
before the Or. H. Comm. on Bus. & Lab.); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 822 (citing different reports
to prove the potential of the socially responsible investing market); Deborah J. Walker, Please Welcome
the Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 151, 179–180 (2013) (member of the
drafting committee of the Minnesota Act referring to socially responsible investing). See also Hearing
on AB 361, supra note 31, at 4 (stating that the bill will enable benefit corporations to “attract capital
from the growing community of investors seeking both financial return and social impact”); Press
Release, State of Del., Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation (July 17, 2013)
(stating that the public benefit corporations statute will help accelerating the socially responsible
“investment opportunity”), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-benefitcorporation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/TW6M-92UN].
37. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, 819–20 and the studies they refer to; see Press Release, State of
Del., supra note 36 (stating that public benefit corporations will help businesses “attract customers”).
Although the proponents focus on consumers, this category could be expanded to all potential contracting
parties since, for instance, suppliers may also be especially keen on doing business with benefit
corporations. Some B Corporations are already awarded discounts by other B Corporations. See Save
Money and Access Services, B LAB (listing a number of B Corporations offering discounts to other B
Corporations), https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/why-become-a-b-corp/save-money-andaccess-services [https://perma.cc/W3YA-WDFX].
38. See Press Release, State of Del., supra note 36 (stating that public benefit corporations will help
businesses “attract talent”). See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of
Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, at 39 (Geo. Univ. Law Ctr., Scholarship @ Geo. Law,
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817881 (mentioning the potential psychic rewards for employees of
public benefit corporations and comparing them to nonprofit employees).
39. See Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 823–24.
40. See infra note 63–65 and accompanying text.
41. See Anurag Gupta, L3C’s and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field Between
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 214 (2011); Steven
Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the
Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 174 (2012) (explaining a double
consequence of this inability: the time and money invested in finding donors and the difficulties securing
loans because of the “inconsistent access to capital for repayment”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of
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enterprise with the double purpose of public-benefit creation and profit
generation. Further, it is a typical feature of social enterprises to have
income-generating activities at the core of their business and to directly or
indirectly harness these activities to achieve public benefit.42 For nonprofits,
however, tax regulations significantly limit the allowed commercial
activities.43 Other inconveniences facing nonprofits include limitations in
terms of lobbying and political campaigning.44 As a result, many social
entrepreneurs are bound to use for-profit entities as vehicles for their
businesses.
Accordingly, the growing demand by investors, consumers, and
employees should result in a strong spike in creation of for-profit social
enterprises. This is when the proponents’ second claim — the legal obstacles
hindering the supply of social enterprises — becomes relevant.
b. Legal Uncertainty for Corporations With a Broader Purpose.
Proponents argue that directors who consider other interests than those
of the shareholders when running a business face a significant risk of liability
for breaching their fiduciary duties.45 The magnitude of this risk is contested
Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 354 (2009) (focusing on the difficulties in
securing debt financing).
42. E.g., Patagonia, a clothing-retailer California benefit corporation sells outdoor clothing as its
core business. Some of its social and environmental actions are directly part of its core business (e.g.,
using environmentally preferred materials). Others are an indirect result of the revenue generated by the
core business (e.g., donating one percent of sales to environmental organizations). See J. Haskell Murray,
Defending Patagonia: Mergers & Acquisitions With Benefit Corporations, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485,
488 (2013) (listing some social and environmental initiatives of the company).
43. Anurag Gupta, L3C’s and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field between
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 215 (2011); Steven
Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the
Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 174 (2012).
44. Anurag Gupta, supra note 43, at 213.
45. See Bill Campbell, Equilibrium Capital Group Principal, Testimony before the Or. S. Bus. &
Transp. Comm. (May 16, 2013) (explaining the narrow definition of fiduciary duties in Delaware and the
fact that the influence of this on Oregon drove him to join the drafting process for the statute). See also
Eric Friedenwald-Fishman, creative director of the Metropolitan group, Testimony before the Or. S. Bus.
& Transp. Comm. (May 16, 2013) (mentioning the “potential confusion and perception of risk for
directors” that would be solved by the bill). In California, the author and B Lab claimed that the bill
would enable directors to have clarity about the fact that their fiduciary duties would include “creating a
material positive impact on society and the environment, even in liquidity scenarios[.]” Hearing on AB
361, supra note 31, at 4. Walker, supra note 36, 157 (referencing the concern of director liability by a
member of the Minnesota Act’s drafting committee). See also Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361
Before the S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. (Cal. 2011) (statement of Sen. Juan Vargas, Chairman, S.
Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm.) (arguments in support of the bill made by the American Sustainable
Business Council and the Social Venture Network); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 825–38.
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and this paper does not intend to take a stance in the debate about the
corporate purpose.46 While proponents and some authors argue that
corporate law mandates that corporations “maximize the (long-term)
interests of the corporation’s stockholders,”47 others claim that directors are
allowed to balance both shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests and
that there is no legal requirement to (only) maximize shareholder value.48 In
any case, this debate and the ensuing legal uncertainty49 was one of the
reasons why proponents of benefit-corporation legislation believed that a
statutory intervention was necessary. Benefit-corporation statutes are thus
adopted to create legal certainty by shielding benefit corporation directors
from shareholder suits based on director consideration of the public-benefit
purpose or stakeholders’ interests.50
46. The following description is simplified and is not intended to capture all the nuances in this
debate.
47. See, e.g., Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 825–26; Kristin A. Neubauer, Benefit Corporations:
Providing A New Shield for Corporations With Ideals Beyond Profit, 11 J. BUS & TECH. L. 109, 112–13
(2016) (discussing Delaware law); Ian Kanig, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation:
Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
863, 872–78 (2013); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1176 (1981) (arguing that
managers have to maximize returns for shareholders); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent
Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 177–90 (2008) (arguing that the shareholder
maximization norm exists, but is only a default rule and is rarely enforced).
48. Chu, supra note 9, at 163–81 (discussing corporate law history, articles of incorporations, state
statutes and state case law to conclude that there is no such thing as a legal requirement to maximize
shareholder wealth maximization); David Groshoff, Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise
Legislation’s Feel-Good Governance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 238–39 (2013); Justin Blount
& Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem,
44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 660 (2013) (arguing that there is no legal obligation for managers to (only)
maximize profits); Cummings, supra note 12, at 587–588 (stating that there is no statutory requirement
to maximize shareholder value and that the exceptions in takeover and reorganization situations are
effectively countered by constituency statutes and the business judgment rule). See also Kent Greenfield,
A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 17,
18 (2014) (arguing that benefit corporation legislation is based on a misinterpretation of the law).
49. See Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4. The drafters of the Oregon
benefit company statute acknowledge that lawyers disagree on this issue but that the uncertainty remains.
They then mention that the statute they have drafted ends this uncertainty. References to this uncertainty
are widespread in the literature. See Chu, supra note 9, at 183 (“ambiguities in the law”); El Khatib,
supra note 9, 155 and 169 (“uncertainty”); Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation¸12 WYO. L.
REV. 91, 95 (2012) (“uncertainty”); Murray, Master, supra note 1, 17 (“confusion”); Walker, supra note
36, 159 (2013-2014) (“confusion”); Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An
Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1005
n.26 (2013) (“litigation risks”).
50. Chu, supra note 9, 183 (although the author disagrees with the need for benefit corporation
statutes, she acknowledges the benefit for mission-driven directors in terms of doing away with legal
ambiguities creating a risk of liability). Most authors who believe that there is no requirement to
maximize shareholder value — a requirement that effectively hinders mission-driven companies —
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The Need to Differentiate from Greenwashing Companies.

To explain why legislators choose to create a separate legal entity with
a duty to pursue the public benefit and to take non-shareholder interests into
account, the two preceding factors do not suffice. Other options existed for
legislators wishing to create more legal certainty for social entrepreneurs.
For instance, a constituency statute allows, but does not oblige, directors to
take other stakeholders’ interests into account when making business
decisions.51 Constituency statutes are a simple way to eliminate the concern
of shareholder primacy.52 A variant on these statutes — allowing traditional
corporations to select a socially and environmentally responsible governance
structure — could have removed the legal obstacles for social
entrepreneurs.53
The missing piece of the puzzle is the need for differentiation from
greenwashing companies — greenwashing being defined as “disinformation
disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally
responsible public image.”54 Not only do the proponents argue that there is

regard the adoption of benefit corporation statutes as unnecessary. In their opinion, the traditional for
profits are suited to accommodate mission-driven companies and creating benefit corporations even
undermines this possibility. See El Khatib, supra note 9, 175–181 (pointing to the growing data on the
success of socially responsible enterprises, the constituency statutes, and the business judgment rule, as
well as critically reviewing the case law); J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation and
Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 153 (2013) (calling the created dichotomy the “Bipolarity
Problem”); Groshoff, supra note 48, at 234 (“This Article suggests that SEL [social enterprise legislation]
is a “con” led by entrepreneurs called ‘contrepreneurs.’ . . . I argue that contrepreneurs have advanced a
deceptive maze of needless SEL using ethically-questionable marketing”). See also Stefan J. Padfield,
Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 33–34 (2015)
(warning that pushing socially responsible entrepreneurs to a specific legal entity could marginalize CSR
and even create “CSR “ghettos”). But see Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate
Law and Benefit Corps, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276, 297 (2012) (calling the shareholder primacy
norm “ill founded” and “faulty” but considering benefit corporation legislation desirable because this
legislation promotes pluralism in corporate forms).
51. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 829–830 (describing constituency statutes). See El Khatib,
supra note 9, 164–165 n.72, for references to all (33) states with constituency statutes.
52. Chu, supra note 9, 172 (claiming that the shareholder primacy doctrine is effectively invalidated
in a majority of states which have constituency statutes). But see Clark & Babson, supra note 9, 831–
833 (deeming the existing constituency statutes insufficient because of the legal uncertainty caused by a
lack of case law and because they don’t protect mission-driven investors and executives who are in a
minority position).
53. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations — A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 595 (2011) (referring to the Oregon example, see infra note 61).
54. Oxford Online Dictionary, 2004, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/greenwash
[https://perma.cc/UZ6K-A5MG]. Greenwashing is not only targeted at consumers, but also at investors
and employees. See, e.g., Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate
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an increased demand and that there are obstacles hindering the supply but,
they also often refer to the risk of greenwashing.55 Since companies are
aware of the value of corporate social responsibility, all claim to act this way,
causing a decline in trust by the public.56 As mentioned above, investors,
consumers, and employees are eager to invest in, consume products or
services of, or work for socially and environmentally responsible
companies.57 They are even willing to accept a lower return on investment,58
a higher price on goods or services,59 or a lower wage,60 if they can trust the
claims made by enterprises. The main reason for the need of a separate legal
entity with a duty to pursue public benefit and consider non-shareholder
interests is the creation of a label of reliability for the companies’ claims
regarding social and environmental responsibility.61 In other words, the
America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674–87 (2009) (about the rise of
greenwashing, its targets, and its impact) and Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
280, 283 (2013) (arguing that greenwashing should not only be analyzed through business to consumer
cases, but also through business to business cases). For the purpose of this article, greenwashing must be
construed more broadly as not only creating an environmentally responsible public image, but also a
socially responsible public image.
55. See infra note 51–62 and accompanying text.
56. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 820 (discussing the fact that the more popular terms in the
social enterprise sphere are used, the less they mean).
57. See supra note 35–38 and accompanying text.
58. Craig R. Everett, Measuring the Social Responsibility Discount for the Cost of Equity Capital:
Evidence from Benefit Corporations, 3 J. BEHAV. FIN. & ECON 55, 69 (2013) (finding that the ninety-four
founders who were surveyed were willing to accept thirty-five percent less return on equity compared to
an investment in a regular corporation). Note that this lower financial return on investment would
normally be coupled with a higher social return on investment. See generally Adam Richards, Social
Return on Investment and Social Enterprise: Transparent Accountability for Sustainable Development, 3
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE JOURNAL 31, 33–34 (2007).
59. See Stephanie M. Tully & Russel S. Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in Willingness to Pay
for Socially Responsible Products: A Meta-Analysis, 90 JOURNAL OF RETAILING 255, 262 (2014) (finding
a mean premium for socially responsible products of 16.8% and that sixty percent of respondents were
willing to pay at least part of this premium); Plerhoples, supra note 38, at 40 (referring to TOMS Shoes’
“buy-one-give-one business model” and the willingness of consumers to pay more because they know a
second pair will be donated). See generally Christopher Marquis and Andrew Park, Inside the Buy-OneGive-One Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2014, at 28, 31–33 (about the positive results of
this model).
60. See Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 52 (suggesting that social enterprises may be able to pay
their employees less because of “nontangible benefits” and “loan forgiveness programs” which have
recently been created by business schools such as the Yale School of Management and the NYU Stern
School of Business, and stating that even without loan repayment, employees may accept a lower wage
because of the socially and environmentally responsible nature of the enterprise).
61. See Plerhoples, supra note 38, at 40 (referring to authors arguing that the branding benefit is
the main benefit of social enterprise statutes). See also Joseph W. Yockey, Using Form to Counter
Corruption: The Promise of the Public Benefit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 639–40 (2015)
(expressing his doubts concerning the legal obstacles for social enterprises and naming the branding
advantages targeting investors, employees and consumers as a “better justification for the PBC”). See
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separate legal entity helps to persuade investors, consumers, and employees
that the company’s socially and environmentally responsible approach is
genuine, and does not constitute greenwashing.62
d. The Benefit Corporation’s Raison d’Être: Accountability for
its Social Purpose.
Professor Henry B. Hansmann famously gave a demand-focused raison
d’être for nonprofits. He argued that “contract failure” in the market for
goods and services that are hard to evaluate by consumers, in terms of value
and quality, needed to be solved by imposing a “non-distribution

also Rujeko Muza, Benefit Corporations: The Need for Social For-Profit Entity Legislation in NorthDakota, 90 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 581, 595 (2014) (“While constituency statutes afford greater protection
for directors, they do little for companies, employees, consumers, and shareholders who want to require,
rather than just permit, directors to consider non-financial interests.”) But see Clark & Babson, supra
note 9, at 838 (naming the shareholder primacy norm as one of the two reasons, besides avoiding
greenwashing). I argue that shareholder primacy is not a sufficient reason to explain the need for benefit
corporation statutes (supra note 51–54 and accompanying text). This may even be more clear in states
creating benefit LLC’s such as Maryland and Oregon. In certain states, LLCs are so flexible that authors
deem them appropriate to be used by social entrepreneurs, see, e.g., Murray, Master, supra note 1, 19;
Emily Cohen, Benefit Expenses: How the Benefit Corporation’s Social Purpose Changes the Ordinary
and Necessary, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 269, 273 (2013) (referring to the Uniform Limited Liability
Act which allows LLCs to have other purposes than for profit purposes). In Oregon, the adoption of the
benefit company statute is even more proof of a desire to create a differentiating brand, since Section
60.047 of Title 7 of the Oregon Revised Statutes already permitted companies to include in their articles
of association a “provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the
corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.” This provision was adopted
in 2007.
62. Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 2: The drafters of the Oregon
benefit company bill mention “differentiat[ing] the company in a confusing marketplace in which
everyone is claiming to be a responsible or green business” as a benefit of being a benefit company. In
California, B Lab and the author of the bill mentioned this differentiation as a benefit of incorporating as
a benefit corporation, see Hearing on AB 361, supra note 31, at 4. The United States Green Building
Council California Advocacy Committee also refers to the general public benefit provisions as a way to
differentiate benefit companies from companies doing socially and environmentally responsible actions
as a form of marketing; see S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. Hearing, supra note 45. See also William H.
Clark Jr. & Larry Vranka, Benefit Corporation White Paper, at 22 (Jan. 18, 2013) (referring to the
mandated pursuit of a general public benefit as a protection against greenwashing) http://bene
fitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG6-LHT2].
See Walker, supra note 36, at 57, where a member of the Minnesota Act’s drafting committee made an
argument about avoiding greenwashing. See also Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1085 (listing
“decreased greenwashing” as one of the advantages of benefit corporations because of the heightened
accountability); Chu, supra note 9, at 183–85 (acknowledging the signaling power of benefit corporations
to differentiate themselves from greenwashing companies).
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constraint.”63 Given that nonprofits may not distribute profits to the people
controlling them,64 consumers are more willing to purchase these goods and
services, since raised prices or lowered quality would not (directly) benefit
these people.65
A similar reasoning can be applied to benefit corporations. Rather than
to solve market failure, benefit corporations have been created to exploit a
market opportunity. This opportunity lies in the increased demand by
consumers, investors, and employees for social entrepreneurship. To be
useful to exploiting this market opportunity, benefit corporation statutes
impose their own double constraint: An obligation to (i) take nonshareholder interests into consideration and (ii) pursue the general and/or
specific66 public benefit while being profitable. The true raison d’être of
benefit corporations is thus supplying a corporate form accountable for its
socially and environmentally responsible mission in response to the
increased demand by consumers, investors, and employees.67
In order to do this, the benefit corporation statutes have created a public
brand.68 This brand could be defined, by using the oft-used mantra about

63. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980). Cf. I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2012) (“no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual”).
64. Hansmann, supra note 63, at 838 (mentioning “members, officers, directors or trustees”).
65. Id. at 843–45.
66. Most states follow the MBCL and mandate the pursuit of a “general public benefit,” while
allowing the companies to set a specific benefit that they want to pursue. See J. Haskell Murray,
Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes, available at https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 [https://perma.cc/4BN9-ZQWM], for an overview of
the states following the MBCL. A minority of states follow the Delaware statute model, which mandates
the pursuit of a specific public benefit, but does not require the pursuit of a general public benefit as such,
see id. Some authors criticize this approach, see, e.g., El Khatib, supra note 9, at 188, or express their
concerns about such an approach, see Clark & Vranka, supra note 62, at 22 (referring to the mandated
pursuit of a general public benefit as a protection against greenwashing). I, however, agree with Strine
and Montgomery, who focus on the duty to operate in a “responsible and sustainable manner” and the
duty to take stakeholder interests into account. See Strine, supra note 34, at 244. See also John
Montgomery, Mastering the Benefit Corporation, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 3–4. For the purpose
of this paper, it is important to note that both models create a brand and that the Delaware model does not
weaken the brand to an extent that would warrant significantly more lenient accountability.
67. Compare Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1043 (mentioning the “enhanced
accountability to purpose and stakeholders” as the raison d’être of benefit corporations) with Frederick
Alexander, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Widening the Fiduciary Aperture to Broaden the
Corporate Mission, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 66 (2016) (stating, in the context of normal corporations,
that “while corporations could certainly be good employers and valuable resources to the community,
that was not their raison d’etre — corporate law was about creating value for the stockholders, who
owned the corporation, and who elected its managers to oversee their investment”).
68. The distinction between “public branding” and “private branding” is made in Murray, Master,
supra note 1, at 45 (advocating for a strong private brand coupled with a more flexible corporate law).
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benefit corporations: Businesses that meet higher standards of corporate
purpose, accountability, and transparency.69 The influence of this public
brand should not be underestimated. Empirical evidence suggests that
consumers react favorably to brands of companies who support social causes
for (what are perceived to be) “appropriate reasons.”70 The state’s
authorization71 to carry the benefit-corporation name may well contribute to
the perception of legitimacy of a company’s social actions.72 In sum, states
grant benefit corporations a concession of a brand. Indeed, this concession
may well warrant a limited73 and partial74 revival of a modernized concession

Other commentators acknowledge the branding purpose of the benefit corporation law; see, e.g.,
Cummings, supra note 12, at 594, and Walker, supra note 36, at 157.
69. This phrase is stated by the proponents of the statutes, e.g., Governor Jack Markell, A New Kind
of Corporation to Harness the Private Enterprise for Public Benefit, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013,
2:06 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gov-jack-markell/public-benefit-corporation_b_3635752.html [https://perma.cc/Z4P3-XQ5B] (“Delaware public benefit corporations . . . will have three unique
features that make them potential game changers. These three features concern corporate purpose,
accountability, and transparency”); Jay Coen Gilbert, Can I Get A Witness?! The Evolution of Capitalism,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 7:08 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-coen-gilbert/benefitcorporation-legislation-_b_976650.html [https://perma.cc/4F62-6E34]. Also echoed in the literature:
e.g., Michelle J. Stecker, Awash in a Sea of Confusion: Benefit Corporations, Social Enterprise, and the
Fear of “Greenwashing,” J. ECON. ISSUES 373, 376 (2016); Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 29.
70. See Michael J. Barone et al., The Influence of Cause-Related Marketing on Consumer Choice:
Does One Good Turn Deserve Another? 28 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 248, 249 (2000).
71. Only a minority of states requires benefit corporations to include the designation of the
corporate entity type in the firm name. Murray, Market, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L.
REV. 541, 559 (2016) (listing the states where this is the case but, including Delaware where this
requirement has been repealed by 250 Del Laws Ch. 40 (S.B. 75)). Although I agree with Murray that a
requirement to include the name may help create a stronger brand, id. at 560, I do not think that the
absence of such a requirement hurts the brand in such a way that would not require any accountability.
Of the 321 public benefit corporations incorporated in Delaware between August 1, 2015, and August 8,
2016 (the entry into force of the amendment and the last day incorporations where accounted for in the
file sent to me by the Delaware Secretary of State’s Office), 241 of 321 public benefit corporations used
either P.B.C., PBC or Public Benefit Corporation in their firm name. In Oregon, there are no requirements
mentioned in the statute concerning the designation as a benefit company. However, a nonnegligible
amount of benefit companies with websites referred to their status as benefit company and all benefit
companies are searchable online. States requiring benefit corporations to identify their benefit
corporation status include Minnesota (2012); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(4) (2016); and
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1804.D (2016).
72. Alnoor Ebrahim et al., The governance of social enterprises: Mission drift and accountability
challenges in hybrid organizations, 34 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81, 86 (2014) (stating — in
regards to L3C’s, Community Interest Companies and Benefit Corporations — that the legal recognition
gives more legitimacy to the dual purpose of social enterprises).
73. Not implying that corporations are not the product of a contract and only require filing of
articles of incorporation. It is not necessarily based on the grant of “permission” to incorporate but rather
on the grant of a “state-conferred benefit.” See infra note 75.
74. Only applicable to benefit corporations and potentially to other social enterprise statutes.
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theory75 of the corporation.76 While the criticized old variant focused on
concession through state regulation,77 the focus for benefit corporations
should be on accountability.78
Accountability is thus crucial for benefit corporations and the lack
thereof could have severe negative consequences. In the short term, allowing
the incorporation of benefit corporations without an enforceable
accountability system would, in effect, create the risk79 of a state-sanctioned
form of greenwashing.80 On a more long-term basis, if this core rule is not
enforced, benefit corporations do not respond to the demand in the market.
75. The concession theory entails that corporations are created through concession by the state,
rather than by private contracting, see Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liabilities and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 85 (1991); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in
the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 832, 842 (2013); David Ciepley,
Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTs. 221,
224 (2013).
76. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 39, 42 (tying the concession theory to benefit
corporations because of the positive effect of the brand name.). Cf. Padfield, Silent Role, supra note 75,
at 842 (mentioning the “state-conferred benefit argument” as a way to tie the concession theory to the
modern era with simple formations through filings). But see David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice
Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility after Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197,
1219–20 (criticizing this “state-conferred benefits” claim in the context of corporate political speech
based on modern theories of corporate law and the First Amendment). See Stefan J. Padfield, The DoddFrank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 218–20 (2011), for a
rejection of Yosifon’s arguments. See also Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 50, 1–
34 (arguing that proponents of mandatory CSR should support the concession theory of corporate
personality).
77. For common criticism about the old variant (and arguments aiming to refute this criticism), see
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 342–59 (2014). See id. at
333, about the focus on regulation.
78. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law,
4 HARV. BUS. L. REV 345, 357 (stressing the importance of consistency, monitoring and enforcement to
maintain a useful brand).
79. The proponents of benefit corporation are conscious of this risk and consider the “higher
standards of corporate purpose, accountability[,] transparency,” the potential liability, and the reporting
requirements as sufficient to curb this risk. See Clark & Vranka, supra note 62, at 23–24, and Be the
Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4 (acknowledging the risk of greenwashing and
mentioning the reporting against a third-party standard, imposing a general public benefit purpose and
the enforcing mechanism as ways to mitigate this risk). Some commentators have expressed their
concerns about the accountability system and have argued that it may lead to “legalized greenwashing.”
See El Khatib, supra note 9, at 181. See also Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 33 (warning that an
inappropriate accountability system may cause “an unprecedented amount of rent seeking”).
80. In explaining this risk, I do not assume that firms choosing to incorporate as or to convert to
benefit corporations are per se planning on “greenwashing.” I merely aim to point out the risk that is
created by the current legal regime. Besides, the risk of greenwashing should concern all involved parties.
The states will only have created a viable corporate entity if its signaling force is reliable, which is
impossible when there is a high risk of greenwashing. Existing benefit corporations will also want this
risk to be limited, because a reliable signaling force is precisely one of the reasons why they decided to
become a benefit corporation.
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This would make the corporate form unnecessary. Investors, customers, and
employees would first trust the created label of social entrepreneurship.81
After a while, however, this initial trust would fade and the lack of an
efficient system of accountability would endanger the sustainability of the
benefit corporation as a legal entity.82
2.

Accountability requires public reporting

All state legislators use a “transparency-based accountability” model.83
Although this choice has been criticized in the literature,84 it is the current
state of the law in all states with benefit corporation legislation and an
analysis of alternatives would fall outside the scope of this paper.85
The accountability system comprises two compulsory pillars: Director
(and officer) liability and periodic benefit reports.86 However, a description
of these rules urges a distinction between two different models: The MBCL
and the Delaware model.87 Some of these differences contribute to the view
that the Delaware public benefit corporation system is more flexible than the

81. Currently, the label is used in a figurative sense, although one author has argued for the creation
of a benefit corporation label (comparable to the label for certified B Corporations) in California. See
Sarah Thornsberry, More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis of the Benefit Corporation Movement in
California, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 159, 186–87 (2013).
82. See Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 622 (stressing the importance of reliability
of the claims of social value and arguing that the enforcement of the dual mission is critical for this
reliability); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 735–36
(2013) (focusing on the importance of enforcement of the different standard of social enterprises).
83. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84. See Cummings, supra note 12, at 578–627 (offering an alternative model of accountability
based on adaptive learning, internal accountability and accountability to professional peers and to those
who the corporation claims to benefit); Thomas J. White, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight
through Creation of the Benefit Corporation Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329, 346–52 (2015) (advocating
for the creation of a Benefit Corporation Commission which would act as a more reliable guardian of
stakeholder interests).
85. For some alternatives, other than those in the previous footnote, see, e.g., Michael A. Hacker,
People Planet and Perversion: The Need for Attorney General Enforcement in Benefit Corporation
Legislation, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818855&download=yes
[https://perma.cc/8YC7-A893].
86. “Officers” is mentioned between brackets because three states — Colorado, Maryland, and
Tennessee — did not explicitly create a regime for officer liability in benefit corporations. The MBCL
also provides for the optional appointment of a “benefit director” and or a benefit officer. A benefit
director is an independent member of the board who is in charge of preparing an annual compliance
statement. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(c) (2016). A benefit officer prepares the benefit report
and has all the powers relating to the creation of general or specific public benefit. MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS §304(b)(2016). This optional extra layer will not be discussed further and was not included
in the Colorado, Minnesota, or Delaware statutes.
87. See Appendix I for an overview of all statutes’ public reporting provisions.
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MBCL.88
In the following paragraphs, the two compulsory pillars will be
discussed for both models.
a. Director and Officer Liability Requires Private Reporting.
While the different statutes limit director and officer liability in a number
of different ways, I will mainly focus on two important factors: The potential
plaintiffs and the standard of review.89
The MBCL provides for a “benefit enforcement proceeding” as the only
way to claim damages for the failure of a benefit corporation to pursue
general or specific public benefit, or for other violation of obligations, duties,
and standards of conduct created by benefit corporation legislation.90 Under
the MBCL, this suit can be brought by a limited number of plaintiffs:
(1) directly by the benefit corporation; or
(2) derivatively . . . by:
(i)

a person or group of persons that owned beneficially
or of record at least [two percent] of the total number
of shares of a class or series outstanding at the time of
the act or omission complained of;

(ii)

a director;

(iii)

a person or group of persons that owned beneficially
or of record [five percent] or more of the outstanding
equity interests in an entity of which the benefit
corporation is a subsidiary at the time of the act or
omission complained of; or

(iv)

other persons as specified in the articles of

88. See Plerhoples, Who’s opting in?, supra note 22, at 254 (explaining how this fits in Delaware’s
corporate law tradition); Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, at 351 (also referring to Delaware’s corporate
law tradition).
89. Other limitations include the limitations in terms of monetary damages; see infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
90. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 305(a). Identical provisions adopted, e.g., in ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 10-2433.A; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305(a); and CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601(b), 14623(a). But see
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.766 (calling this a proceeding against a benefit company, without using the
term “benefit enforcement proceeding”).

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

54

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14:1

incorporation or bylaws of the benefit corporation.91
Some states have the same restrictions but do not provide a threshold of
percentage of shares for shareholders. The Oregon statute does not grant
standing to equity holders of subsidiaries.92 Colorado and Minnesota are
among the minority of states that do not provide a separate benefit
enforcement proceeding (from the proceeding used to claim damages for
director liability)93 and they limit the number of plaintiffs for derivative suits
even more. In these states, suits cannot be initiated by directors, affiliated
companies, or persons mentioned in the bylaws or articles — only
stockholders satisfying a certain threshold may bring suit.94 Finally, it is
important to note that most states’ statutes explicitly mention that directors
(and officers) do not owe any duty to the beneficiaries of their public benefit
purpose.95
The MBCL,96 the Oregon statute,97 the Colorado statute,98 the Minnesota
statute,99 and the Delaware statute100 all apply (some kind of) business
judgment rule to directorial (and managerial) decisions in benefit
corporations. Since the “interests of the corporation” are broadened under
benefit corporation law,101 this gives directors (and officers) more discretion
— applying the business judgment rule using a broader “corporate interest”
gives directors more discretion since they could refer to stakeholder interests
to justify a decision which harms shareholders. As such, the main focus of

91. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS 305(c) (2016). See also Section (d) of the MBCL for a definition
of beneficial ownership.
92. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305(c). But see OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 60.766, which does not state such a threshold either for regular shareholders and does not provide
standing to shareholders of subsidiaries.
93. See Appendix I.
94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §367. Colorado has a nearly identical provision. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-101-508. Minnesota does not provide a threshold for shareholders but it does provide the same
provision in all other respects. MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.202.1.
95. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(5)(c) (governors); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
60.764(3)(c) (officers and managers); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(2)(a) (directors); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §365(b) (directors).
96. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 301(e) (2016), and explanatory comment by the author
(referring to the business judgment rule explicitly). Same provision: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-2432(F).
97. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(4). Section 60.760(4) refers to Sections 60.357 and 63.155,
which state the Oregon variant of the business judgment rule for corporations and LLCs.
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(b).
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.201 subdiv. 4.
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b).
101. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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litigation will likely be procedural, rather than substantive.102
Unless shareholders expressly agree to give standing to other
stakeholders, only shareholders (and in some states, directors) are able to
initiate a liability claim.103 This in effect gives shareholders the key to
safeguard the social and environmental mission of the company.104 To be
able to fulfil this role, shareholders need information. It is thus logical to
require the benefit corporation to present the shareholders with some
information about their achievements in terms of public benefit.105 To
achieve that goal, every statute requires benefit corporations to prepare a
periodic benefit report106 and to send it to the shareholders.107 The content
of this report differs in the MBCL and the Delaware model108 but both report
models asses a company’s achievements in pursuit of their public benefit.
b. Efficient accountability requires public reporting.
Even if shareholders are fully informed, however, director (and officer)
liability is an imperfect instrument to hold benefit corporations accountable
for their double mission.109

102. See Kanig, supra note 47, at 899 (emphasizing the strict procedural liability for the failure to
— at least procedurally — consider non-shareholder interests in board decisions).
103. The assumption is that the stakeholders (the community, employees) will, in principle, not be
shareholders and at least not meet statutory thresholds. Note the interesting proposal by Alicia Plerhoples,
supra note 38 (advocating for a requirement to have stakeholders as shareholders in public corporations
pursuing a charitable public benefit and thus enable certain stakeholders to sue).
104. Callison warns that shareholders could also misuse this key and use it as a tool for greenmail.
Callison, supra note 50, at 154.
105. Reiser, Social Enterprise, supra note 82, at 707 (“Information is a precondition for effective
investor enforcement.”) Note that only Vermont benefit corporations provide for a shareholder vote about
the benefit report. See VT. STAT. ANN tit. 11A, § 21.14(c). Only if endorsed by a majority of the
shareholders, will the benefit corporation be able to place the report on the website.
106. The report is annual in the MBCL. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401, 402. The report is
also annual in Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1)),
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301., subdiv. 1); as well as in all the other states, see Appendix I,
except in Delaware, where the report is biennial unless the articles or the bylaws require a more frequent
delivery, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(b).
107. This is the case in all statutes listed in Appendix I except the Minnesota statute. Minnesota
Public Benefit Corporations are technically not obliged to send the report to shareholders. However, they
do have an obligation to file the report with the secretary of state’s office, who publishes the report online.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301.1; see also infra note 233.
108. Amongst other reasons, because Delaware does not require the use of an independent thirdparty standard, see infra note 304 and accompanying text. While Colorado’s statute is very similar to
Delaware’s in many respects, it does mandate the use of a third-party standard in the benefit report, see
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1)(b).
109. See also Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, 362 n.98 (suggesting that the statute makes the
proceeding “impotent on purpose” because of the fear of frivolous lawsuits).
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The first reason is the limited number of potential plaintiffs. Unless
shareholders expressly agree to give standing to other stakeholders, they are
able to keep a de facto monopoly on the standing to initiate a liability suit.110
Unlike in traditional corporations, however, shareholders are not expected to
safeguard only their own investments; benefit-corporation shareholders
might be expected to safeguard a social and environmental mission
benefitting other beneficiaries. It seems fair to say that in cases of conflict
with their own monetary interests, shareholders may not play a perfect
safeguarding role.111
This issue is exacerbated by the traditional collective action problems of
derivative suits.112 While lead-plaintiff shareholders have to bear substantial
costs, they also must share the benefits with the other shareholders — in
benefit corporations, also with stakeholders. Certain states’ monetarydamages limitations in suits against benefit-corporation directors and
officers only increase this problem.113
Moreover, the increased discretion given to directors (and officers)114
makes it even harder for shareholders to enforce the public mandate.115
110. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. The shareholders’ power is shared with the
directors in some of the states but, in closed benefit corporations, the interests of directors and majority
shareholders will be aligned.
111. See White, supra note 84, at 346 (arguing that the mere right for shareholders to voluntarily
initiate a benefit enforcement proceeding does not sufficiently safeguard other stakeholders’ interests);
id. at 347 (explicitly casting doubts about whether shareholders will protect stakeholders’ interest when
they conflict with theirs); Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, 1040–43 (pointing out the problem of
shareholder under-motivation due to the lack of monetary incentives and the problem of stating a harm
when there is no economic injury to the corporation — also mentioning the exception of shareholder
over-motivation if shareholders are also stakeholders); Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at
613 (pointing to the obvious conflict of interest); Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 45 (expressing
his doubts about the adequateness of shareholders to defend other stakeholders’ interests, after mentioning
the problem of conflicts of interests). See also Groshoff, supra note 48, at 262 (writing with a very critical
view on shareholders’ willingness to start a benefit enforcement proceeding in case of harm to other
stakeholders’ interests). A potential example of the inadequateness of letting shareholders guard the
interest of stockholders is the fact that only seven percent of California benefit corporations complied
with the requirements of publicly disclosing their benefit report, according to Murray’s study, although
California explicitly allows the benefit enforcement proceeding to be used against the failure of a benefit
corporation to post the annual benefit report. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3).
112. Dana Brakman Reiser, Social Enterprise, supra note 82, at 716 (pointing out that this is even
more the case than fore traditional corporations because of the limitations in terms of monetary damages).
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(5) (governors), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 60.764(3) (officers)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.202 subdiv. 1(b).
114. See supra note 86.
115. See Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 613. It will also arguably make it harder to
enforce the fiduciary duties towards shareholders. This concern has been expressed by numerous interest
groups in different states. See, e.g., S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. Hearing, supra note 45, at 7
(comments by the Corps. Comm. of the Bus. L. Section of the Cal. State Bar).
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Therefore, transparency is also necessary to preclude directors (and officers)
from furthering their own interests and taking advantage of the enhanced
discretion they have by using stakeholder interests as a false excuse.116
Given the imperfection of the director (and officer) liability instrument,
it is not surprising that the MBCL and most states’ statutes mandate public
availability of the periodic reports.117 All states with such an obligation,
except for Oregon,118 require benefit corporations with websites to post the
reports on their websites.119 If they have no website, the benefit corporation
must send it to any person requesting it, free of charge.120 In Delaware and
two other states that recently adopted similar statutes, public reporting is not
mandated by the statute but may be mandated by the company’s certificate
of incorporation or by its bylaws.121 In Minnesota, public reporting is
achieved by filing the report with the secretary of state’s office, which
publishes the reports online.122
This system of public reporting is aimed at informing other stakeholders
about the benefit corporation’s public-benefit achievements.123 Informed
stakeholders are more able to intervene and signal when a company is not
actually doing what it purports to do.124 Critics of the transparency-based
accountability system have expressed their concerns about the ability of
outside stakeholders to monitor benefit corporations’ public mandate.125
While this monitoring may not be perfect, there are sufficient reasons to
believe that it would at least add value to the imperfect director (and officer)

116. See generally, about this risk, Cummings, supra note 12, at 589–90 (arguing that accountability
is crucial to avoid this); Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 600.
117. See Appendix I.
118. Oregon gives companies the choice between publication on the website or on request. It is
unclear whether this was intended. There is no reference to this in the preparatory works. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 60.768(4).
119. See Appendix I.
120. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 402(c). Note that New Jersey and New York do not provide a
request procedure. The statute only mentions that the benefit corporation should post the report on the
website if it has one. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(c); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708.
121. The two other states are Kentucky and Texas. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(c)(2); app. I.
122. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301 subdiv. 1. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
123. Strine, supra note 34, at 244 (stating that the Delaware statement is targeted at informing
“investors and other constituencies”).
124. Plerhoples called this kind of accountability “indirect,” in the sense that they cannot directly
sue directors. See Alicia Plerhoples, Social Enterprise, supra note 25, at 134.
125. See infra note 80.
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liability system.126 Informed consumers can then “vote with their feet”127 or
use social media and other internet-based applications to express their
concerns about certain companies’ public-benefit practices.128 Employees,
who may have sacrificed monetary benefits to work at a social enterprise,129
will be inclined to enforce the public purpose by sharing their concerns.130
Other contracting parties such as suppliers could use benefit reports to
inform their decisions to enter into a contract or to grant discounts.131
Competitors could sue benefit corporations who issue misleading or
erroneous reports.132 Finally, potential new investors could use the reports
to assess the genuineness of a company’s public purpose.133
B. TRANSPARENCY AS A SEPARATE GOAL
The aforementioned “mantra” defining benefit corporations contains
transparency as the third prong of the added brand value of the benefit

126. See Brett McDonnell, Committing To Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 64 (2014) (explaining that fiduciary duty constraints
are insufficient and complemented by reputational constraints, and attributing an important role to benefit
reports to create this latter constraints).
127. By not purchasing goods and services from companies with poor reports. See Plerhoples, Social
Enterprise, supra note 25, at 134 (albeit critical because of the lack of standardization). Cf. Legislative
Talking Points, B LAB (stating that the benefit report could help consumers make more informed
decisions), http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/legislative-talking-points [https://perma.cc/5HRR-CPBF].
128. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378. See, e.g., Corporate Petitions, CARE 2 PETITIONS, (a petition
site with a separate page for corporate accountability), http://www.thepetitionsite.com/corporateaccountability/#hottest [https://perma.cc/C66W-M8PT]. I acknowledge that the existing literature on
consumer rationality could create doubts as to whether consumers would really intervene. See generally
Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer Psychological
Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81–161 (2000); M. Neil Browne
et al., Protecting Consumers From Themselves: Consumer Law and the Vulnerable Consumer, 63 DRAKE
L. REV. 157 (2015). My claim is not, however, that consumers alone, or even together with other
stakeholders, will create perfect monitoring. I merely believe that they would create an added value to
the director (and officer) liability system.
129. See supra note 38.
130. If their concerns do not lead to actions, employees could decide to leave to work for other social
enterprises. The competition for young employees, who are increasingly concerned with social impact,
may well be another factor driving companies to comply. They could also act as whistle-blowers, see
Stecker, supra note 69, at 378.
131. See supra note 37.
132. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378 (mentioning pressure by competitors). This author also
mentions other potential policing constituencies — media, consumer protection groups, individuals,
social and environmental organizations. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text about this
pressure in terms of fraud suits.
133. See Legislative Talking Points, supra note 127 (stating that the benefit report could help
investors make more informed financing decisions).
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corporation statutes.134 The added value of mandatory public reporting can
mostly be tied to social enterprises’ need to differentiate themselves from
greenwashing companies.135
First, a corporation’s commitment to periodically reporting public
benefit achievements assessed against a third-party standard diminishes the
risk of (perceived) greenwashing.136 Second, the choice to opt in to a system
with costly mandatory disclosure rules may have a strong signaling power.137
One author argues that the “credibility or signaling power of statutory
requirements that allow for sanctions” will always be superior to private
hiring of auditors.138 Hence, transparency may well be a separate goal, as it
enforces and supports the constraint in a similar manner as the nondistribution constraint does for nonprofits.139
C. THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE COSTS
Producing a benefit report obviously comes at a cost. This cost may be
especially taxing for small enterprises and startups140 and can be divided in
direct and indirect costs.141
The direct cost of producing a benefit report is relatively low. There are
plenty of free third-party standards142 and third-party certification is not
mandated. Obviously, preparing the report will have a certain opportunity
cost, as it will temporarily divert the attention of one or more employees
from the core business of the company. However, benefit corporations have
committed to put the social purpose at the core of their enterprise.143 It would
134. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
136. Cf. Legislative Talking Points, supra note 127 (stating that the reporting requirements help
prevent greenwashing).
137. Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALABAMA L. REV. 767, 821 (2015)
(comparing this with federal securities laws).
138. Id. at 821.
139. Ibid.
140. For the purposes of this paper, “startup” is used to refer to recently created companies which
do not necessarily seek exponential growth.
141. This distinction is also a distinction between ex-ante costs and ex-post costs.
142. The three third-party standards used in the analyzed reports — the B Impact Assessment, the
Global Reporting Initiative and Green America — are all free. For links to the pages of these three
standards and other potential third-party standards, see How do I pick a Third Party Standard, B LAB,
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard [https://perma.cc/LU57-U5NP].
143. See, for instance, Eric Friedenwald-Fishman Testimony, supra note 45: “The legislation gives
companies . . . the legal protection to do good and do well by allowing us to incorporate individual ideals
of social responsibility and environmental awareness into the very fabric of our companies.” See also Be
the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4. By explicitly opting out of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, benefit corporations make their social and environmental mission a second
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thus not make sense to exempt them from publishing a report since their
commitment to the social purpose, if genuine, implies tracking their
progress. Besides, corporations who have a social and/or environmental
mission will often feel the need to report this to the public.144 Finally, from
the standpoint of costly reporting as a signaling device, reporting has to bear
a certain cost to play its role.145
The indirect costs, such as the legal consequences of a poorly drafted
report, could potentially be higher. Many benefit corporations are startups146
and small companies147 with inherently limited budgets, preventing them
from hiring expensive lawyers and consultants like listed corporations
preparing Corporate Social Responsibility reports.148 However, there are
several ways to mitigate this problem. The different secretary of state’s
offices could follow Minnesota’s example and make a template available.149
Second, while it seems unlikely that mere unintentional misstatements will
lead to massive litigation,150 in extreme cases of intentionally misleading
bottom line; see Michael Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0-A Breakthrough in
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2011).
144. Chu, supra note 9, at 186. Chu argues that the reporting requirements impose too much costs
on corporations who already publish about their impact. However, she acknowledges that these
corporations are willing to invest in reporting their impact, which in effect diminishes the extra costs of
creating a benefit report, especially when the marketing benefits of a reliable benefit corporation label are
taken into account.
145. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. See Yockey, supra note 137, at 821
(mentioning that the requirements should be mandatory and backed by sanctions). I believe it would be
wrong to say that there is no need for an additional administrative burden for benefit corporations, see,
e.g., Eric Franklin Amarante, The Colorado Benefit Corporation Act’s Missed Opportunities, at 8,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030427 [https://perma.cc/74FY-YE2L], if this burden is necessary
to enforce this double constraint that constitutes the raison d’être for this new legal entity.
146. See Appendix II.b, III.b, IV and V.b.
147. See id.
148. But see Burkhart et al., supra note 23 (finding that 44% of respondent benefit corporations
“received help from a third-party consultant to address social benefit goals, requirements” but that (only)
“25% of those respondents think the services were useful in helping to achieve their social benefit goals”).
149. Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation / Annual Benefit Report, OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF
STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/1934/dcannualbenefitreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST97-QYXD].
150. A practical consideration limiting the risk of actual tort liability for misrepresentations may be
the small size of most benefit corporations. It seems unlikely that the plaintiff’s bar would massively
target companies with very limited assets in a similar way to multinationals, such as in the Kasky v. Nike
case, as described in Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate
America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 690–91 (2009). Securities fraud claims about
greenwashing will probably also be hard to bring because of the difficulty to prove materiality and
causation. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of
“Green Oil Companies,” 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & EVN’T 133, 136 (2012). In my opinion,
the main litigation risk for socially responsible enterprises will continue to come from claims based on
labelling of products and advertising slogans, such as the claims alleged in Daugherty v. Method
Products. See Class Action Complaint at 18–22, Daugherty v. Method Products, PBC, No. 16-01226

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

PUBLIC REPORTING BY BENEFIT CORPORATIONS

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

61

statements or fraud, the risk of liability is a socially desirable deterrent.151
While the public reporting requirement obviously comes at a certain
cost, these costs are limited and warranted in view of the purpose of the
benefit corporation legal entity. Admittedly, some companies will decide
not to adopt the benefit corporation structure because the costs do not make
it worthwhile for them. These costs and the filtering effect they create are
necessary to allow benefit corporations to differentiate themselves as nongreenwashing companies.
D. VERY LIMITED ENFORCEMENT
With the importance of transparency in mind, it is flabbergasting that the
enforcement mechanisms are as limited as they are. Most states’ statutes,
with Minnesota as a notable exception,152 provide very limited guarantees.153
The MBCL requires the filing of the report with the secretary of state’s
office, but less than half of the states have mandated this and a minority of
these states have provided for an explicit sanction for not filing.154 Only a
handful of states explicitly make the benefit-enforcement proceeding
available for claims regarding the publication of the benefit report155 but, it
seems that the language of the other statutes that create benefit-enforcement
proceedings implicitly make the proceedings available for such claims.156
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016), ECF No. 1. See also Vincent v. People Against Dirty, PBC, http://www.mpp
settlement.com [https://perma.cc/NA3D-EPLN].
151. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378 (mentioning anti-fraud suits as a way to make sure that benefit
reports are accurate); McDonnell, supra note 126, at 33–34 (mentioning the importance of anti-fraud suits
as a way to monitor the reliability of the reports and suggesting that Rule 10b-5 will probably be
applicable). See also Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 194
(2012) (arguing for explicit statutory sanctions for directors including false or misleading information in
the benefit report); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 847 (2013) (mentioning that directors are already
subject to litigation for fraud or intentionally misleading statements and considering this as “ a sufficient
incentive to provide complete and accurate benefit reports”).
152. See infra note 233–235 and accompanying text.
153. An example of the limited enforcing is described by Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, at 359
n.82 (describing how a Maryland benefit corporation claiming to be the first benefit corporation in the
world failed to comply with the requirement to post the report online). Maryland’s secretary of state’s
website has listed this corporation as “forfeited” (last visited, Jan. 18. 2017).
154. See infra Appendix I for an overview of the 13 states which require filing, the fee they charge,
and the timing of this filing. See the same Appendix for a listing of the different sanctions provided by
the statutes.
155. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1402(2); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1351(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.030(3); W. VA. CODE ANN. 31F-4-403(a). See also
Appendix I.
156. The MBCL defines “benefit enforcement proceeding” as: “Any claim or action or proceeding
for (1) failure of a benefit corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit
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The effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism, however, is highly
doubtful, theoretically,157 and Professor Murray’s early study indicated that
the enforcement is insufficient in practice.158 The hypothesis that the
existing enforcement mechanism does not lead to a (sufficiently) high
compliance rate, will also be tested in Part II.
II. PUBLIC REPORTING DATA
In this part, I focus on the actual data of public reporting by benefit
corporations. The majority of the literature agrees on the important role of
transparency but the prevailing assumption — that benefit corporations will
actually publish these reports — needs examination. Some pre-existing data
suggests that there is an acute problem in benefit reporting that may
undermine the sustainability of benefit corporations.159 After a short review
of this pre-existing data, I present and analyze the data I collected in Oregon,
Colorado, Minnesota, and Delaware about the number of reporting
companies, as well as a number of other variables, such as companies’
principal place of business, date of incorporation as a proxy for corporate
age,160 third-party certifications, and number of employees as a proxy for
size. I have also tried to analyze industries as a variable but the limited
information available prevented a determination of industry with sufficient
certainty to include this variable in my analysis.
I chose Oregon, Colorado, Minnesota, and Delaware because they
represent the majority of the different approaches states have taken with
regards to public benefit reporting.161 Oregon mandates public reporting, lets
purpose set forth in its articles; or (2) violation of any obligation, duty, or standard of conduct under this
[chapter].” MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (emphasis added). The comment under this section of
the MBCL clarifies that one of the obligations enforceable through the benefit enforcement proceeding
is the obligation to post the report on the website or provide it on request. All states that have adopted
this broad definition of benefit enforcement proceeding have thus arguably implicitly made the
proceeding available to enforce this obligation. See Appendix I for an overview.
157. See supra notes 89-116 and accompanying text for the concerns regarding the efficiency of the
benefit enforcement proceeding.
158. See infra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. This proxy is imperfect since it counts corporations who reincorporated as benefit corporations
or were created by merger of acquisition as new corporations. However, it is the best available proxy to
evaluate this variable and it is the proxy used by earlier articles analyzing the same variable. See
Plerhoples, Who’s Opting In?, supra note 22, at 260 (acknowledging the imperfection but noting, id. at
n.60, that the date of incorporation still refers to the original date of incorporation, even in case of
conversions and pointing to the lack of websites as an indication of the high number of startups); Eric L
Talley, Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California (and Beyond), 9,
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 [https://perma.cc/UN5F-73S8].
161. Furthermore, they were offering the data for free.
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companies choose between website publication and publication-by-request,
and does not provide for explicit sanctions for not reporting.162 Colorado
mandates public reporting, requires companies with websites to post their
report online, and does not mention any legal sanctions for non-reporting.163
Minnesota mandates filing benefit reports with the secretary of state’s office
and provides a sanction for noncompliance.164 Finally, Delaware makes
public reporting optional.165
A. PREEXISTING DATA
In a 2015 article,166 Professor Murray describes how he looked for the
benefit reports of the benefit corporations formed in 2012 in California,
Hawaii, New York, and Virginia — both on websites and by contacting
representatives, or the registered agent of, the corporations.167 He found a
compliance rate of between eight percent and ten percent (if he leaves out
the nonresponsive companies). Furthermore, Professor Amarante found that
only one of the 697 Nevada benefit corporations has complied and published
its benefit report online.168 The compliance level in Maryland is reported to
be low as well.169
B. OREGON
1. Legal Background
Section 60.768 of the Oregon Revised Statutes requires benefit
companies to prepare an annual benefit report and send it to their
shareholders.170 It also obliges benefit companies to either make all of their
benefit reports available on “the publicly accessible pages of the benefit
company’s website” or to provide a copy of the most recent benefit report
without a charge to a person requesting it “unless providing a copy would
162. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
163. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
166. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13.
167. He did the actual search in July 2014. Id. at 33.
168. Eric Franklin Amarante, Why does Nevada Have so Many Benefit Corporations? [Blog Post]
(the results will be presented in a future article), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstra-ct_id=2897684 [https://perma.cc/PZ23-64HH]. See infra note 281 and accompanying text
for one potential reason for this low compliance in Nevada.
169. See Burkhart et al., supra note 23.
170. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1) and (3).
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violate a provision of applicable law.”171 Oregon is the only state that
mandates public reporting but does not mandate companies with websites to
post their reports on their website.172 The Oregon statute does not mention
an explicit deadline for the report to be posted or sent173 and does not provide
for an explicit sanction for noncompliance.174 Finally, Oregon is the only
state I analyzed where both corporations and LLCs can adopt the benefit
company form.175
2. Hypothesis
Formulating a realistic hypothesis as to the benefit-reporting compliance
rate requires a comparison of the states mentioned above with the Oregon
regulatory regime. Since Oregon lets both corporations and LLCs opt for
the benefit company status, one would expect to see smaller companies and
thus less resources to produce a benefit report. Furthermore, since my data
set was larger and surfaced a larger time span, the influence of early adopters
— who may even have lobbied for the passing of the bill — may be more
limited, leading to a lower percentage of compliance. On the other hand, I
granted the companies five more months to comply.176 Also, my study is
done approximately two years after Professor Murray’s so the learning costs
may have dropped, leading to a higher compliance rate. Therefore, I believe
that the differences with Murray’s study balance each other out so I have set
the hypothesis at ten percent compliance.
3. Methodology
I analyzed the 133 benefit companies which were created before
December 31, 2014, and listed as active benefit companies on Oregon’s
Secretary of State’s website on January 6, 2017.177 By choosing this cut-off

171. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768 (4). It is uncertain what provision would warrant such an
exception.
172. See Appendix I.
173. Ibid.
174. Although Section 60.766(1) of the Oregon Revised Statutes arguably implicitly makes the
derivative suit against directors available in case of not publication of the report. See also supra note 156
for states which create a benefit enforcement proceeding.
175. The only other state providing this option is Maryland.
176. In July 2014, Murray looked at reports of companies incorporated in 2012. In January 2017, I
looked at reports of companies incorporated in 2014 or before.
177. The list contained 139 companies but I manually checked each company’s page on the secretary
of state’s website and six other companies were inactive, although still counted as active in the DOS excel
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date, I wanted to make sure that, in the absence of a statutory deadline,178 the
corporations had enough time to publish a report.
My methodology consisted of searching for each company’s website by
browsing the internet and looking for a benefit report on this website. I
carefully looked at every relevant page of the websites and counted the
companies that posted their benefit reports.179 In January 2017,180 I sent
emails, letters, social-media messages, and messages through contact forms
to all companies whose benefit report I had not been able to locate, formally
requesting that they send me their report.181 In February 2017, I sent a
reminder to the companies who still had not sent me their reports.182
Additionally, I used publicly available information to collect data on
other variables, including companies’ principal place of business,183 date of
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,184 third-party certifications,185 and
file. The six companies are DP Staffing LLC, DP Packaging LLC, Xedecnation LLC, Goes LLC, Sweet
Spot Yoga LLC, and Fabienne Photography & Design LLC.
178. The Oregon statute provides a deadline of 120 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year
or concurrently with the delivery of the annual report to shareholders. There is no such statutory deadline
to post the report online or make it available to the public. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.770(3) and (4).
179. While this method does not offer a guarantee that I did not miss a benefit report, I believe that
if a careful researcher is unable to locate the report, it is unlikely that an average third party (be it a
potential consumer or supplier) would be able to locate it. Furthermore, in the communications sent to
companies whose benefit reports I was not able to locate, I asked them to point me to the section of their
website where they did post it, in case I missed it.
180. Between January 5 and January 9, 2017, I tried to contact all the companies in a time period of
about ten days, to make sure they would not quickly create a report prompted by other companies in the
small social enterprise sphere. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 34, for a similar concern and
methodology.
181. To limit the costs and the environmental impact of my study, I did not send letters to companies
whose email address I had or that I could contact through email, a contact form or through social media.
For the letters, I used the addresses I found on the secretary of state’s office website. When address of
principal place of business and mailing address where different, I sent a letter to both.
182. I had to use letters for 80 companies. Some of them were returned to me with the message
“undeliverable as addressed,” “insufficient address,” “no such number” and “forward time exp.” I sent
new letters to the addresses mentioned on the secretary of state’s website, tried to contact individual
members and founders and tried to find new addresses. The fact that some companies’ address does not
seem to correspond with a real address, that their forwarding time is expired etcetera does not exclude
that they would have shared this information if I had the opportunity to call them, but the fact that I, as a
member of the public (and “any person”) am not able to receive their report on request makes them
noncompliant.
183. Principal place of business is derived from the secretary of state’s website (collected on Jan. 6
2017).
184. The date of incorporation is derived from the companies’ page on the secretary of state’s
website (collected on Jan. 6, 2017). See supra note 160 about this proxy.
185. I checked whether the benefit companies in the sample were certified by B Lab as B
Corporations or certified by Green America. For the B Corporation certification, I used the Find a B
Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/6QW2-8HBY],
webpage and searched for the benefit company names. I also checked the companies listed under
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number of employees as a proxy for size.186 I have not been able to determine
the number of employees for every company, limiting company-size
results.187 I applied the chi-squared test with Yates’s correction for
continuity, as well as Fisher’s exact test to establish whether the differences
in reporting across the different variables are significant. I set the level of
significance at 0.05.
When assessing whether a company complied with the mandatory
publication of a benefit report, I have shown leniency and have decided not
to disqualify reports because they lack information mandated by the
statute.188 In general, when a company published a document, called it
“benefit report,” and included most of the required information, I have
considered this as a compliant company.189 Of course, there is no statutory
obligation to use the expression “benefit report” and documents with a
comparable content have also been accepted as compliant.190
Furthermore, even if I chose December 31, 2014, as a cut-off date,
aiming to compare compliance with regards to the 2015 report, I have shown
some leniency here as well. Companies that published a 2014 report but not
a 2015 report have also been counted as compliant.191 I believe that this
leniency is legitimate because the statute does not provide a deadline to
publish the report.192
Although some leniency is shown with regards to the satisfaction of the
content requirements and with regards to the timing, I do not believe it would
be legitimate to accept B Impact Reports as sufficient to comply with the
benefit reporting requirement in Oregon. These B Impact Reports are
prepared for certified B Corporations but lack the narrative description

“Oregon.” Screen captures of the pages on B Lab website are on file with the author. For the Green
America certification, I searched for the benefit companies names on the Green America website
(National Green Pages, GREEN AMERICA, http://www.greenpages.org/). Screen captures of the pages on
Green America’s website are on file with the author. I also checked every company’s website (if existing)
to check whether they mentioned another certification. I did not count product certifications or local
sustainability certifications, because they do not assess both social and environmental issues.
186. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from
their websites (screen captures on file with the author).
187. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit
corporations.
188. See Appendix II.a for a more detailed description of which legal requirements were complied
with by the different benefit corporations.
189. See Appendix II.a for an overview of how every compliant benefit corporation met the legal
requirement.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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prescribed by the statute.193 Furthermore, B Impact Reports are not
published every year, but rather every two years. To be sure, being a B
Corporation is a sign of the willingness to be transparent but it does not in
itself imply compliance with benefit company requirements.
4. Results
The compliance rate is slightly higher than the hypothesis. Nineteen
(14%) of all benefit companies complied, fourteen did this via their website,
and five sent their report on request.194 Twenty-five percent of the
incorporated benefit companies complied, while approximately eleven
percent of the benefit LLC’s complied.195 The compliance percentage would
only rise to seventeen percent after elimination of all companies that have
been administratively dissolved since the data set was composed196 and to
thirty-three percent after exclusion of companies without active websites.
The compliance rate is significantly higher among converted benefit
companies (53%) than among companies which incorporated as benefit
companies (6%).197
Many early adopters complied. For instance, all six companies
designated in 2013 have complied.198 The compliance rate among
companies designated as such before the end of January 2014 is sixty-five
percent,199 while only five percent of the other 113 companies complied.
This difference is statistically significant.200
I only found a number of employees for thirty-six of the 133 benefit
companies. All of them fall below the 500 employees limit used by the
Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration to define

193. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1) and (3). The website does include “Company Highlights”
which are, however, extremely limited, not specified per year, and not included for all companies.
194. See Appendix II.b.
195. Ibid.
196. The data set I chose inherently represents a snapshot. Removing these companies from the data
set altogether would not be warranted given the fact that nineteen of the 133 companies in the data set
have filed for reinstatement at least once after been dissolved by the secretary of state.
197. The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with
Yates’ continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
198. While the statute entered into force on January 1, 2014, companies could make the necessary
filings before and some are officially designated as benefit companies in December 2013.
199. Thirteen out of twenty companies complied.
200. The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with
Yates’ continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
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small businesses.201 The majority of these benefit companies were even part
of the category of microbusinesses, 202 with between 1 and 10 employees.203
Among the companies I could find a number of employees for,204 I noticed
a trend of increasing compliance when moving to categories with more
employees.205 The compliance level is thirty-three percent in companies
with one to ten employees, seventy-eight percent in companies with eleven
to fifty employees, and one-hundred percent in companies with more than
fifty employees.206 It is impossible to know, however, whether this trend is
representative for the whole population.
Twenty of the 133, or fifteen percent of the analyzed benefit companies,
are certified by a third-party.207 The difference in compliance between
benefit companies certified by a third-party (60%) and the non-certified
benefit companies (6%) is statistically significant.208
Finally, ninety-eight percent of the benefit companies have their
principal place of business in Oregon.209 The difference in compliance with
companies having their principal place of business out of state is not
significant.210
C. COLORADO
1. Legal Background
Section 7-101-507 of the Colorado Revised Statutes requires public
benefit corporations to prepare an annual benefit report and to send it to their

201. See Appendix II.b. See Office of Advocacy, Frequently asked questions, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3XXQ-85KU].
202. Two-thirds of the benefit companies I found a number of employees for had between one and
ten employees. Office of Advocacy, The Role of Microbusinesses in the Economy, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Microbusinesses_in_the_Economy.pdf, [http
s://perma.cc/R5BQ-5QB5].
203. See Appendix II.b.
204. Ibid.
205. Ibid.
206. See Appendix II.a.
207. Ibid. Sixteen are only B Corporations, two are only certified by Green America, and two are
certified by both B Lab and Green America.
208. See infra II.6 Summarizing table. The p-value is lower than 0.0001 both with Fisher’s exact
test and the chi-square test with Yates’ continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
209. See Appendix II.b.
210. See infra II.6 Summarizing table. The p-value values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square
test with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 1.00 and 0.905. See infra, II.6 summarizing table.
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shareholders.211 It also obliges public benefit corporations with websites to
make all of their benefit reports available on “the public portion of its
website.”212 Public benefit corporations without websites have to provide a
copy of their most recent benefit report without a charge to persons
requesting them.213 The Colorado statute lacks an explicit deadline for
sending or posting the report and does not provide any statutory enforcement
mechanism for the failure to do so.214
2. Hypothesis
Since Colorado has a public reporting system similar to the one in the
states Professor Murray analyzed, I set the hypothesis at ten percent.
3. Methodology
On February 9, 2017, I searched the Colorado Secretary of State’s
database for all public benefit corporations that had their public benefit status
before December 31, 2014.215 After eliminating the dissolved and delinquent
corporations, the data set contained 19 active public benefit corporations.216
I applied the same method as for Oregon benefit companies. In February
2017,217 I checked the public benefit corporations’ websites and sent emails,
letters, and messages through contact forms to all corporations without a
website to request a copy of their most recent benefit report.218 A couple of
weeks later, I sent a reminder to the companies who had not sent me their
report or answered my request.
Just as for Oregon, I used publicly available information to collect data
about other variables, such as third-party certifications,219 date of

211. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1) and (3).
212. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(4).
213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(5).
214. See Appendix I.
215. The Colorado statute requires public benefit corporations to include either PBC, P.B.C., or
public benefit corporation in its domestic entity name. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(4). I then
entered these three designations in the search engine and eliminated the corporations that had these
designations in their name without actually being public benefit corporations.
216. All delinquent public benefit corporations had this status for more than six months.
217. More precisely, on February 10, 2017.
218. Indeed, all public corporations with a website and without benefit report are noncompliant. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(4). Unlike Oregon benefit companies, see supra note 172, Colorado
public benefit corporations cannot choose between online publication or publication on request. Hence,
I only sent emails or letters to the public benefit corporations that did not have a website.
219. See supra note 185. I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon. See supra note 185.

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

70

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

Vol. 14:1

incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,220 and principal place of
business.221 I was not able to track the size of enough companies to include
this variable in the analysis.222 I applied the chi-square with Yates’s
continuity correction and Fisher’s exact test to establish whether the
differences in reporting across the different variables are significant and I set
the level of significance at 0.05.
Finally, when evaluating documents issued by the corporations, I applied
the same leniency as I did for benefit companies in Oregon, with regards to
both content and timing of the report.223
4. Results
Again, the compliance rate is slightly higher than the hypothesis. Two
of the nineteen, or eleven percent of all public benefit corporations
complied.224 One did this by posting its report on the website; the other had
no website and send its report on my request.225 This compliance rate only
rises to 12.5% if companies without websites are excluded.
One out of three converted and one out of sixteen incorporated public
benefit corporations complied.226 The difference is not statistically
significant.227 There is no statistically significant difference between the
corporations that filed for public benefit corporation status in the first
month.228
Only public benefit corporations certified by a third party complied.229
The difference in compliance between public benefit corporations certified

220. The date of incorporation is derived from the secretary of state’s office website.
221. The principal place of business is derived from the secretary of state’s office website.
222. I only found a number of employees for three public benefit corporations, namely Jason Wiener,
P.C., a Public Benefit Corporation (1), Ecospire, PBC (1-10), and Vention Resources PBC (3).
223. See infra Appendix III.a. The Colorado statute also does not provide for a deadline and requires
the benefit report to include a narrative description. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1).
224. See Appendix III.b.
225. Id. See Appendix III.b.
226. Id. See Appendix III.b.
227. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test
with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 0.298 and 0.706. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
228. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test
with Yates’s continuity correction are respectively 1.000 and 0.706. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
The comparative lack of statistical significance in Colorado when compared with the other states is
striking. While it is unclear what the source of this difference is, one hypothesis may be the very small
number of observations in Colorado, as compared to the other states.
229. See Appendix III.b.
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by a third party (100%), and the noncertified public benefit corporations
(6%) is not statistically significant.230
Finally, ninety-five percent of the public benefit corporations had their
principal place of business within the state of Colorado.231 The difference in
compliance with companies having their principal place of business out of
state is not significant.232
D. MINNESOTA
1. Legal background
Section 304A.301 of the Minnesota Statutes requires public benefit
corporations to prepare an annual benefit report and to send it to the secretary
of state before every April 1.233 The secretary of state revokes the public
benefit corporation’s status for failure to file this report.234 There is no
requirement to send the report to the shareholders, but the secretary of state
publishes the reports online.235
2. Hypothesis
The Minnesota statute requires filing of the report with the secretary of
state’s office236 and requires the secretary of state to revoke the public benefit
corporation status of corporations which fail to file their benefit report.237
Therefore, I expected a one-hundred percent compliance level.
3. Methodology
On February 28, I crossed a list of sixty-seven Minnesota public benefit

230. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test
with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 0.105 and 0.186.
231. See Appendix III.b.
232. The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction
are respectively 1.00 and 0.186.
233. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301, subdiv. 1 and § 304A.301, subdiv. 5.
234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301, subdiv. 5 (reinstatement). Reinstatement is possible (subdiv.
6), intentional failure creates a right for shareholders to receive the fair value of their shares (subdiv. 7)
and public benefit corporations have to change their corporate name (subdiv. 8).
235. 2015 Public Benefit Corporation Annual Reports, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF
STATE STEVE SIMON, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/business-liens/business-liens-data/public-benefit-cor
porations-annual-reports-2015/ [https://perma.cc/RY7L-ZQPY].
236. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 subdiv. 1.
237. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 subdiv. 5.

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

72

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

Vol. 14:1

corporations active on August 8, 2016,238 with the secretary of state’s office
database and found thirty-six active public benefit corporations that existed
before December 31, 2015.239 Minnesota only allowed the filing for public
benefit corporation status starting in January 2015, necessitating placing the
cut-off date one year later. Minnesota’s clear deadline for filing each year’s
report allowed this later cut-off date.240
The Minnesota Secretary of State publishes the benefit reports of all
public benefit corporations annually on its webpage. I consulted this
webpage and matched every report with the relevant corporation.
Just as for Oregon and Colorado, I used publicly available information
to collect information about other variables, such as third-party
certifications,241 number of employees as a proxy for size,242 date of
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,243 and principal place of
business.244 I have not been able to determine the number of employees for
every company, which limits the results in terms of company size.245
4. Results
My hypothesis regarding compliance is confirmed. All thirty-six public
benefit corporations filed their reports with the secretary of state’s office and
they are all available online.246 While I have no data about public benefit
corporations whose status may have been revoked for failing to file a report,
it is certain that one-hundred percent of active public benefit corporations247
complied with the requirement.
Finally, ninety-seven percent of the public benefit corporations have
238. I first consulted the list mentioned on List of MN PBC’S, HULI CONSULTING (list current as of
Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.huliconsulting.com/mn-pbc-list/, and then eliminated the benefit
corporations that were inactive on February 28, 2017.
239. Twenty-six of these public benefit corporations were specific benefit corporations, while 10 of
them were general public benefit corporations. Specific public benefit corporations fall under a more
flexible legal regime, comparable to Delaware’s (e.g., no mandatory use of a third-party standard) except
for the obligation to file an annual report with the secretary of state’s office. General public benefit
corporations fall under a regime that is more comparable to the MBCL.
240. See supra note 233.
241. See supra note 185. I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon, see supra note 185.
242. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from
their websites (screen captures on file with the author).
243. The secretary of state’s office website mentioned the date of incorporation.
244. Principal place of business is derived from the website of the companies and sometimes from
publicly available databases.
245. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit
corporations.
246. See Appendix IV.
247. On February 28, 2017.
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their principal place of business within the state of Minnesota.248 Since all
companies complied, breaking down the compliance in terms of the other
variables is superfluous.249
E. DELAWARE
1. Legal background
Section 366 of the Delaware General Corporation Law mandates that
public benefit corporations, at least biennially, prepare a “statement as to the
corporation's promotion of the public benefit or public benefits identified in
the certificate of incorporation and of the best interests of those materially
affected by the corporation's conduct” (i.e., a public benefit statement) and
to send it to their shareholders.250 The default rule does not mandate making
this statement available to the public, but the certificate of incorporation or
bylaws may require this.251 The statute does not mention the way the
statement should be made available to the public.
2. Hypothesis
Since the publication of a public benefit statement is not compulsory, the
hypothesis has to be conceived differently. My hypothesis is that five
percent of the public benefit corporations make this information available to
the public.
3. Methodology
On October 19, 2016, the Delaware Secretary of State’s office sent me a
list of all the public benefit corporations which had been filed.252 After
elimination of the surrendered, dissolved, converted, forfeited, and voided
companies, I had a data set of 161 public benefit corporations filed before
December 31, 2014.253
248. See Appendix IV.
249. See Appendix IV for a breakdown.
250. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b).
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c).
252. E-mail from Lora J Nacrelli to Maxime Verheyden (Oct. 19, 2016, 11:04 AM) (on file with
author).
253. I eliminated the public benefit corporations listed as such in the file authored by April Wright,
who works at the Secretary of State of Delaware. The file dates from October 2016 and was posted on
the Data World database, https://data.world/newco/newco-mission-statements [https://perma.cc/B7BUJQUB], in November 2016. The surrendered, dissolved, and converted status is voluntary, so I decided

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

74

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

Vol. 14:1

In January 2017,254 I sent emails, letters, social-media messages, and
messages through contact forms to all companies whose benefit statement I
was not able to locate on the internet. I inquired whether they had opted for
voluntary disclosure and if so, whether they were willing to send me their
statement.255 In February 2017, I sent a reminder to the companies who had
not sent me their report or answered my question.
Just as for Oregon, Colorado, and Minnesota, I used publicly available
information to collect data about other variables, such as companies’ thirdparty certifications,256 number of employees as a proxy for size,257 date of
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,258 and principal place of
business.259 I have not been able to determine the number of employees for
every company, limiting the results in terms of company size.260 I applied
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction, as well as Fisher’s
exact test to establish whether the differences in reporting across the different
variables are significant. I set the level of significance at 0.05.
Finally, when evaluating documents issued by the corporations, I applied
the same leniency as I did for benefit companies in Oregon, with regards to
both content and timing of the report.261
4. Results
Again, the reporting rate was slightly higher than the hypothesis: Eight
percent. Seven percent reported via the website and one percent sent me
to leave them out of my data set. Forfeited is a status for companies without a registered agent. I checked
and all the companies with this status did not have a registered agent on January 8, 2017. I decided to
still send out letters and emails to void companies. If one of them had responded, I would check whether
they had regularized their situation.
254. From January 9 until January 11, 2017.
255. For eighteen companies, the only address I found was the registered agent’s. None of them
responded. Some letters were returned to me, but the reasoning of note 180 applies here as well: If I, as
a regular member of the public, am unable to contact them to find the report, it is not publicly available.
256. See supra note 185. I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon.
257. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from
their websites (screen captures on file with the author).
258. The date of incorporation was available in the file sent to me by the Delaware secretary of
state’s office.
259. Principal place of business is derived from the website of the companies and sometimes from
publicly available databases.
260. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit
corporations.
261. See infra Appendix V.a. The Delaware statute made “making the statement available to the
public” optional and does not mention anything about a deadline if a corporation’s articles or bylaws
require such publication. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(c)(2). This would thus be something that
could be stipulated in these articles or bylaws.
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their report on request.262 This reporting rate would only rise to eleven
percent if all of the companies without websites and the companies that I
only contacted the registered agents for would be excluded.
Of those reporting, fewer incorporated as public benefit corporations
originally (5%) than those that converted to the public benefit status (15%).
The difference in reporting between converted and incorporated companies
is not statistically significant.263
A substantial portion of reporting corporations were among the first to
file for the public benefit corporation status. Five of the fourteen that filed
on the first day have published their report. The reporting rate of public
benefit corporations designated as such within one month after the entry into
force of the statute is twenty-six percent, compared to five percent for laterdesignated public benefit corporations. This difference is statistically
significant.264
I have found the number of employees for ninety-seven of the 161 public
benefit corporations. All of these companies, except one, fell below the 500employee threshold for small businesses.265 The majority of these companies
were microbusinesses with between one and ten employees.266 Among the
companies I found a number of employees for,267 I noticed a trend of
increasing compliance in categories of companies with a higher number of
employees. Eight percent of corporations with one to ten employees, 14.29%
of corporations with between one and fifty employees, and thirty-three
percent of the corporations with more than fifty employees reported.268 It is
impossible to know, however, whether this trend is representative for the
whole population.
Twelve percent of the analyzed public benefit corporations are certified
by a third-party.269 The voluntary disclosure level is forty-percent for this
group.270 The difference in compliance between public benefit corporations
262. See infra Appendix V.b.
263. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p-value is 0.090 with Fisher’s exact test and 0.1290 with
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
264. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p-value is 0.004 with Fisher’s exact test and 0.003 with
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
265. See infra Appendix V.a. The only exception was Rasmussen College, Inc., a Public Benefit
Corporation, with between 1,001 and 5,000 employees.
266. See infra Appendix V.a.
267. These are the ninety-seven companies mentioned above.
268. See infra Appendix V.b.
269. See infra Appendix V.b. Note that this does not include Ian Martin PBC (an American
subsidiary of a Canadian certified B corporation) or the subsidiaries of People Against Dirty, PBC (People
Against Dirty Manufacturing, PBC and Method Products, PBC). See also infra note 357–58 about groups
of benefit corporations.
270. See infra Appendix V.b.
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certified by a third party (40%) and the non-certified public benefit
corporations (3%) is statistically significant.271
I found princip place of business addresses for 122 public benefit
corporations. The principal places of business of the public benefit
corporations are dispersed over at least272 twenty-two states. Forty-nine of
122 (or 40% of) public benefit corporations have their principal place of
business in California.273 Only three have their principal place of business
in Delaware.

271. See infra II.6 summarizing table. The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact
test and the chi-square test with Yates’ continuity correction. See infra II.6 summarizing table.
272. I was unable to locate the headquarters of thirty-seven public benefit corporations.
273. See infra Appendix. V.b.
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F. SUMMARIZING TABLE
STARTUP

THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION

Oregon
Converted

Reported

Converted

Did not

Oregon Third-party

report

certification

13

12

6

102

Incorporated

Certified
Not certified

p-value
Fisher

Reported

<

tailed)

0.0001
<

Chi square with

(Two-

tailed)

0.0001

Yates correction

tailed)

Did not

Colorado Third-

report

party certification

Colorado
Reported

Converted
Incorporated

1

2

1

15

Not certified

0.298

Reported

Converted
Incorporated

Fisher

(Two-

0.706

Yates correction

tailed)

Did not

Delaware Third-

report

party certification

6

34

7

114

Not certified

0.186
Not reported

8

12

5

136

Fisher

tailed)

< 0.0001

p-value

Minnesota
converted

0.105

(Two0.090

p-value
tailed)

17

p-value

tailed)

Yates correction

1

Reported

Certified

(Two-

(Two-

0

tailed)

Chi square with

p-value

Chi square with

1

p-value

Delaware

Fisher

Not reported

(Two-

tailed)
p-value

Converted

< 0.0001

p-value

(Two-

tailed)

< 0.0001

Reported

Certified

p-value

Yates correction

106

p-value

(Two-

(Two-

7

tailed)

Yates correction

Chi square with

8

(TwoFisher

Chi square with

Fisher

12

p-value

(Twop-value

Converted

Not reported

Reported

Chi square with

(Two-

0.129

Yates correction

tailed)

Did not

Minnesota third-

report

party certification

Converted

14

0.000

Certified

Incorporated

22

0.000

Not certified

< 0.0001
Did not

Reported

report

5

0.000

31

0.000
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Oregon early
adopter
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Did not
Reported

Early adopters

report

Oregon size

13

7

6

107

Other

Reported

1-10 employees

8

11-50 employees

7

51+ employees

3

Unknown

1

Not reported
1

p-value
Fisher

(Two-

<

tailed)

0.0001

p-value
Chi square with

(Two-

<

Yates correction

tailed)

0.0001

Colorado early
adopters

9

Did not
Reported

report

Colorado size

Reported

Not reported

Early adopters

0

3

1-10 employees

Other

2

14

11-50 employees

n/a

2
n/a

1.000

51+ employees

n/a

n/a

0.706

Unknown

p-value
(TwoFisher

tailed)
p-value

Chi square with

(Two-

Yates correction

tailed)

Delaware early
adopters

0

1

Did not
Reported

Early adopters
Other

report

Delaware size

Reported

Not reported

6

17

1-10 employees

4

4

7

131

11-50 employees

5

3

0.004

51+ employees

4

0.003

Unknown

0

p-value
(TwoFisher

tailed)
p-value

Chi square with

(Two-

Yates correction

tailed)

Minnesota early
adopters

6

Did not
Reported

report

Minnesota size

Reported

Early adopters

16

0

1-10 employees

14

Other

20

0

11-50 employees

3

51+ employees

3

Unknown

16

Did not repor
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G. ANALYSIS
A first look at the data urges a distinction between the findings in
Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware where the reporting rates were low and in
Minnesota where the reporting rate was high.
1. Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware
In line with earlier findings of low reporting rates in Hawaii, California,
New York, Virginia, Nevada, and Maryland, I have found low reporting rates
in Oregon (14%) and Colorado (11%). The reporting rate is even lower in
Delaware (8%), where public reporting is optional. These reporting rates all
remain low after exclusion of some companies that may be more likely to be
inactive or less likely to respond. In Oregon, for instance, these reporting
rates remained low (only 33%) after eliminating both subsequentlydissolved companies and companies without websites.274 In Colorado,
eliminating the companies without websites only led to a 1.5% increase.275
In Delaware, excluding the corporations without active websites and the ones
where only the registered agent was contacted leads to a slight increase to
eleven percent.276
In the following paragraphs, I discuss some potential reasons for these
low reporting rates. In order to do that, I cross the reporting rates with the
other collected variables, and I use the answers given by the noncompliant
responding companies
a. Learning Costs
The first potential explanation mentioned by Professor Murray to
explain low compliance rates are the learning costs associated with the new
requirements for benefit corporations.277 Some benefit corporations’
answers suggest that they lack knowledge about their reporting duties. For
instance, some Oregon benefit companies seemed not to know what exactly

274. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
276. This might be necessary to mitigate the risk that the eighteen letters sent to registered agents
did not reach the companies, that the used addresses are based on online and unofficial sources, and to
compensate the fact that some letters were returned to me.
277. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 43.
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a benefit report is.278 Besides these spontaneous reactions, there is a more
quantitative data point to support the learning cost argument. There is a
significantly higher percentage of reporting among early-adopters in both
Oregon and Delaware.279 A substantial number of these early-adopter
compliers were B Corporations and were thus better informed about benefit
corporation reporting requirements.280 A final aspect related to learning
costs, which takes it to a more worrying extreme, is that a subset of the
benefit companies may well have been “nudged into noncompliance.”281
Indeed, Oregon’s model articles of incorporation and articles of organization
make the election of benefit company status dependent on the mere checking
of a box.282 This has probably led a significant number of the benefit
companies to choose the benefit company status without fully realizing the
legal consequences. My analysis showed that four of the eleven
noncompliant Oregon benefit companies who responded did not know they
were benefit companies before I contacted them.

278. One respondent just sent me a URL that included factual information about socially and
environmentally responsible policies, without any periodic element to it, while benefit reports are
inherently periodic and even annual in the case of Oregon. Interestingly, their policy document (dated
June 13, 2014) included reference to the goal to publish an annual report in addition to their sustainability
page. They had not done this more than two years later. Another respondent simply and asked what a
benefit report is.
279. See supra notes 200, 264, and their accompanying text. As mentioned above, this is not the
case in Colorado. The reasons for this are unclear.
280. Fourteen of the twenty benefit companies designated as such in Oregon within the first month
after the entry into force of the statute where B Corporations. Nine of them complied. Nine of the twentythree Delaware public benefit corporations filed in August were B Corporations and four of them
disclosed. Some even actively supported the adoption of the benefit company bill. Equilibrium Capital
Group, Celilo Group Media, and Metropolitan Group were signatories of the Be the Change Steering
Committee’s letter and representatives of these companies were members of the Committee which drafted
the document. Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 6. Cf. Talley, supra note
160, at 7 (describing the high number of incorporations in the first month in California as an example of
“inventorying,” meaning that new benefit corporations were already prepared before the statute took
effect).
281. See Amarante, supra note 168 (suggesting that a majority of the Nevada benefit corporations
have chosen the status unintentionally because of the way the incorporation process is set up — checking
a box and adding a public benefit without any control and limited information — and will fail to comply
with the legal requirements, including the reporting requirements). See also J. MacLeod Heminway,
Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 611, 613–14 (2017) (suggesting unintentional filings as benefit corporations in Tennessee and
Colorado).
282. See Oregon Articles of Organization (mentioning that additional requirements apply),
http://sos.oregon.gov/business/Documents/business-registry-forms/llc-articles.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7
QJ-9GRZ]; Oregon Articles of Incorporation, http://sos.oregon.gov/business/Docu-ments/businessregistry-forms/dbc-articles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NB2-Z3FW].
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b. Startups
The statistically significantly higher reporting percentage among
converted benefit corporations in Oregon283 indicates that startup companies
have a harder time reporting about their impact.284 Besides this statistical
difference, respondents explicitly voiced motives for nonreporting that were
related to their startup status. Two Oregon respondents explicitly referred to
startup-related reasons to explain their noncompliance,285 and ten of the
forty-three Delaware respondents used similar explanations for their lack of
voluntary reporting.286
c. Small Size
Murray also points to the small size of benefit corporations.287 Although
data about size was only found for a limited number of benefit corporations,
the data gathered here reveals that all but one of those companies are small
enterprises.288 The majority are even microbusinesses.289 In Oregon and
Delaware, there seems to be a trend to more compliance when moving from
a category of smaller companies to a category of larger companies.290 The
only exception is Colorado, where both of the complying corporations were
in the smallest category. However, I did not find enough size data in
Colorado to determine whether or not this was simply a reflection of the
smaller size of the population in general. The general trend of lower
compliance of smaller companies is in accordance with prior research in
other domains of corporate reporting showing low reporting compliance
rates by smaller corporations.291
283. See supra note 197.
284. The difference is not statistically significant in Colorado. The reasons for this remain unclear
but the small sample size seems to be a contributing factor. There was no statistically significant
difference in Delaware either.
285. One respondent mentioned the lack of real activity in the marketplace. Another respondent
referred to the fact that his company was still in the “survey process.”
286. These motives included e.g., the too recent launch of the company to assess the impact, only
recently achieved profitability (where the specific public benefit was to share some of these profits) and
mentioning that the company is in “development stage.”
287. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 43–44 (pointing to the fact that a large number of
corporations did not have a website and that the complying companies included larger ones, such as
Patagonia and Greyston Bakery).
288. See supra, II.6 summarizing table.
289. Id.
290. See supra notes 205 and 269.
291. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Tax Policy Become Casualties in the War Against Money Laundering, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV.
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d. Third-party certification
As expected, the reporting level is higher among companies that have
been certified by a third-party.292 This difference is statistically significant
in Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware. Certified corporations are usually
among the largest companies.293 Furthermore, they usually have more prior
knowledge about benefit corporations because of their close relation with B
Lab. Hence, the high number of compliant certified B Corporations
reinforces the company size and the learning costs as reasons for
noncompliance.
e. Absence of Statutory Enforcement
Furthermore, Professor Murray suggested that the absence of real
statutory enforcement also contributed to low compliance results.294 While
California has explicitly made the benefit enforcement proceeding available
to assert claims regarding the failure to post a report, the low reporting rate
implies that this enforcement mechanism is insufficient.295 Oregon
implicitly makes a liability suit available for nonreporting, but this tool also
seems to have very limited effects.296 The contrast with Minnesota, a state
with an actual enforcement mechanism297 and perfect compliance is striking.
f.

Industry

Due to the limited information that was available, it was impossible to
classify companies in industries with sufficient certainty to include this as a
variable.298

623, 636 n.57 (1996) (mentioning a 42% compliance rate for small corporations (less than 10 million
dollars in assets) for the filing of form 8300 (reports of cash payments over $10,000).
292. See supra note 160 about using a company’s incorporation date as a proxy for corporate age.
293. Of the Delaware corporations I found a number of employees for, only thirty-five percent of
certified B Corporations are in the microbusinesses group (1-10 employees), while this is the case for
fifty-two percent of the total population. Of the Oregon corporations I found a number of employees for,
this was the case for 31.25% of certified B Corporations and sixty-six percent for the whole population.
While the only B Corporation in Colorado is small, there is insufficient data about other public benefit
corporations size in that state.
294. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 44–45.
295. See also infra note 323 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 156 and 174; Appendix II.b.
297. See Appendix I for an overview of the statutes.
298. This is a potential area of further research.
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g. Principal place of business
Although there is no significant difference in reporting between out-ofstate companies and domestic companies, the analysis of the principal places
of business did reveal an interesting finding. Unlike in Oregon, Colorado
and Minnesota,299 the majority of Delaware public benefit corporations have
their principal place of business in another state.300 A quick comparison of
these results with the very-low percentage of out-of-state public benefit
corporations and benefit companies incorporated in Colorado, Minnesota,
and Oregon indicates that Delaware is winning at least part of the
competition for public benefit corporation charters.301 Further research is
needed to show whether or not this becomes a trend and whether or not the
victory will be as big for Delaware as its dominance over large and listed
corporation charters.302
h. Third-Party Standards
A first finding is that not all reporting companies use a third-party
standard. Currently, the majority of states, including Oregon and Colorado,
require the use of a third-party standard in the benefit report.303 A minority,
including Delaware, make the use of a third-party standard optional.304
Compliance with the third-party standard requirement is far from perfect in
states where the standard is mandatory. The compliance rates vary from
fifty-eight percent in Oregon to fifty percent in Colorado. In states where
the standard is optional, there is a striking difference between Delaware, at
sixty-four percent, and Minnesota specific public benefit corporations (see
supra, footnote 239), at zero percent.
Further, most companies that published a benefit report and used a third299. See Appendices II.b., III.b. and IV. See also Talley, supra note 160, at 8 (finding that only 5%
of the California Benefit Corporations and Flexible Purpose Corporations were headquartered out of
state).
300. See Appendix V.b.
301. Interestingly, the majority of these out of states corporations could have incorporated as a
benefit corporation in the state where they have their principal place of business. See also Delaware
Committee Report, Purpose of the Bill (mentioning the potential incentives for the formation of new
corporations in Delaware as a reason for adopting the bill).
302. In 2015, eighty-six percent of the corporations based in the United States which did an initial
public offering were incorporated in Delaware. Sixty-six percent of the Fortune 500 companies were
incorporated in Delaware. See Jeffrey W. Bullock, Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual
Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W2
Y-5DGJ].
303. See Appendix I
304. See Appendix I.
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party standard used the B Impact Assessment,305 confirming the position of
B Lab as the market leader. Although many alternatives exist,306 and B Lab
explicitly refers to them,307 there still exists a sentiment that the requirements
for third-party standards may have been written with the B Impact
Assessment in mind.308
Finally, a couple of companies mentioned the inadequateness of the
available third-party standards to measure the impact created by their
specific company. Indeed, social impact standards are in their infancy. One
respondent referred to the difficulties involved with the assessment of carbon
impact.309 Some companies solve this problem by developing their own key
performance indicators to supplement the incomplete third-party standard.310
This too may come at a cost since it seems likely that some companies
decided, when faced with this problem, to simply not report.311 The issue of
inadequacy of the existing standards is mentioned in the literature as well.312
The low level of reporting companies is not the only concern regarding
benefit reports. The concern about limited enforceability of the content
requirements expressed in the literature seems to be confirmed in practice.313
305. Seven of the nine compliant companies in Oregon which used a third-party standard used the
one offered by B Lab. In Delaware, six of the seven voluntary reporting public benefit corporations using
a third-party standard used B Lab’s. See Appendix II.a and V.a. Although early commentators have
indicated that product certifiers and others may decide to enter into the market, the competition remains
limited.
306. See supra note 142.
307. On the website and in legislative documents. See How do I pick a Third Party Standard, supra
note 142; Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31. But see Groshoff, supra note 48,
at 266–65 (stating that “B Lab attempts to create legislation that will coerce entities to pay funds to B Lab
for legally questionable certification tools”).
308. See, e.g., Renatto Garcia, Re-Engineering Georgia’s Corporate DNA: A Benefit Analysis and
Practicality Assessment for Benefit Corporation Legislation in Georgia, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 627, 658
(2012) (arguing that for benefit corporation legislation to serve its purpose, the measures of accountability
and transparency should be set by a “party without bias or interest”).
309. This was a representative of an Oregon benefit company.
310. This was, for instance, the case for Exemplar Companies, a Delaware public benefit
corporation.
311. One Delaware public benefit corporation, for instance, explained how they had found it
challenging to aggregate the benefits their company created and that this was the reason for the lack of
voluntarily compliance. This partially confirms Yockey’s assumption that in absence of efficient
enforcement, companies that have a hard time measuring impact will not or only partially disclose. See
Yockey, supra note 137, at 796.
312. See Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1077 (acknowledging the potential of
inaccurateness of impact measurement). See also Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 48 (about the
inherent difficulties to prescribe reporting of objective information for companies coming from a range
of different industries); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1011–12 (2013). See generally Yockey, supra note 137, at 796 (about
the challenge of “interpreting social information in firms with social complex missions”).
313. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 46 (the levels of uses of third-party standards).

2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

PUBLIC REPORTING BY BENEFIT CORPORATIONS

4/26/2018 12:18 PM

85

Some even argue that the existing content requirements are insufficient.314
While it is clear that the content requirements and the enforcement
mechanism could be ameliorated, I will not go into further detail about the
appropriate statutory amendments to pursue this goal. Such proposals would
need to be informed by a careful study of the existing third-party standards
and an evaluation of a larger sample of benefit reports.
2. Minnesota
The analysis of the Minnesota data teaches that the statutory sanction of
revocation of the public benefit corporation status has led to reporting by all
active companies. While it is uncertain how many times the secretary of
state has actually had to use this sanction,315 Minnesota shows that it can
induce all active companies to report. Further, the requirement to file the
benefit report, coupled with the review by the secretary of state and the
severe sanctions for noncompliance have led to a substantially higher level
of compliance with the third-party standard requirement. Ninety percent of
the Minnesota general public benefit corporations complied, while only
fifty-eight percent of the Oregon benefit companies and fifty percent of the
Colorado public benefit corporations complied.316
Yet, the low number of active public benefit corporations in Minnesota
suggests that this perfect compliance has its price.
It seems unlikely that the three other states would be able to retain or
attract the same number of corporations if they would sanction companies
like Minnesota does. Minnesota’s population of public benefit corporations
are more likely to exhibit the characteristics associated with compliance. For
example, the percentage of converted companies is higher (39%) than in
Oregon (19%), Colorado (15%), and Delaware (25%). Minnesota also has a
higher percentage of companies with more than fifty employees (15%), than
Oregon (8%), Colorado (0%), and Delaware (13%). Finally, Minnesota’s
percentage of certified corporations (13.8%), is higher than Colorado’s (5%)
and Delaware’s (12.4%), and it’s quite close to Oregon’s (15%).

314. See Yockey, supra note 137.
315. Three public benefit corporations have been reinstated, according to the website.
316. Admittedly, the voluntary use of a third-party standard is very low (0%), compared to the sixtyfour percent in Delaware. This probably also stems from the fact that the reporting benefit corporations
in Delaware are the eight percent who want to do more than legally required.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. MANDATING PUBLIC REPORTING
Public reporting is an essential piece of the accountability system
because it enables outside stakeholders to monitor benefit corporations and
to partially ameliorate the imperfect director (and officer) liability system.317
Furthermore, it has a strong individual signaling power.318 I have argued
that, in general, the benefits strongly outweigh the costs.319 The voluntary
system in Delaware has not led to a higher reporting rate than the mandatory
systems in other states.320 Therefore, my first recommendation is to mandate
public reporting.
B. THE ENFORCEMENT-SUSTAINABILITY TRADE-OFF
Before discussing my other recommendations, it is important to briefly
describe the “enforcement-sustainability trade-off.” On the one hand, my
results demonstrate that the reporting levels are low in states without real
enforcement. Compliance is perfect, however, in Minnesota, where the
secretary of state provides actual enforcement. On the other hand, Minnesota
only had sixty-seven active public benefit corporations twenty-one months
after the entry into force of its statute.321 This number is too small to provide
the aura of reliability that social entrepreneurs seek. More adopters are
necessary for the benefit corporation to be a sustainable corporate form. The
Minnesota experience suggests that creating actual enforcement without
considering the practical difficulties experienced by some benefit
corporations will likely deter entrepreneurs from choosing the benefit
corporation legal form.
C. ENFORCING PUBLIC REPORTING
One of the reasons for the lack of compliance with the public reporting
requirements is the lack of enforcement.322 Private enforcement through
director (and officer) liability has proven to be insufficient, which is not
317. See supra, Part I.1.2.
318. See supra Part I.2.
319. See supra Part. I.3.
320. The fact that all reporting rates are low is not an argument against mandating such reporting
but, rather shows some practical problems and lack of enforcement, which urge policy recommendations.
321. List of MN PBC’S, supra note 238.
322. See supra notes 294-97, and accompanying text.
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surprising given the aforementioned limits in terms of standing.323 In
particular, the low compliance rate in California, a state that explicitly
provided this kind of enforcement seems to confirm these presumptions.
1. Enforcement Mechanism
To be able to enforce the public reporting requirement, states need
information. Thus, obliging benefit corporations to file their benefit report
with the secretary of state’s office is necessary.324 Mandatory filing of the
report could further increase the level of compliance by requiring the use of
a third-party standard if the state refuses to file incomplete reports.325 This
would be beneficial for the quality and the comparability of the reports.
However, it is not sufficient since it does not assure the publication of benefit
reports.326
States should mandate filing of reports on an online database or
website.327 Currently, only Minnesota makes the benefit reports of its public
benefit corporations available online.328 Such a database would ensure actual
public availability in a more reliable way than the current combination of
posting the report on the website or providing it on request. This is shown
in practice by the one-hundred percent availability of reports in Minnesota.
The large number of non-responsive companies elsewhere,329 shows that the
option to choose to make the report available on request merely creates an
illusion of public availability. Moreover, the efforts and the slowness
currently represent an important hurdle for stakeholder monitoring. On
323. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 49–50. See supra notes 89-95, and accompanying text.
324. Currently, fourteen of the thirty-one statutes requiring filing of the report with the secretary of
state’s office. See infra Appendix I for an overview of the 14 states who require filing, the fee they
charge, and the timing of this filing. Some commentators have pleaded for a filing requirement, see
Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 47 (combining this suggestion with the need for sanction in case
of noncompliance); Garcia, supra note 308, at 673 (arguing that a filing requirement serves the ends of
accountability and transparency, while advocating for an exception if the Secretary of State is not able to
handle the processing of these reports); Hacker, supra note 85.
325. See infra note 326.
326. It could also inform states about the way benefit corporations are interpreting and applying the
statutory requirements in terms of content of the benefit report. This would enable states to adapt these
requirements or, potentially, sanction unsatisfactory reporting. Rhode Island already has a procedure of
evaluation of the annual report. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-13(e). (If it does not fit the requirements, the
secretary of state sends it back). See OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149. In this
template, the secretary of state’s office mentions that certain information is required in the benefit report
and that the office may return incomplete reports unfiled.
327. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50, 50 n.135 (for the same suggestion). In footnote
135, Murray addresses the problem of extra costs.
328. OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON, supra note 235.
329. See Appendices II.b, III.b, and V.b.
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average, it took reporting benefit corporations thirty-one days after my first
request to send me their report.330 Requiring every company to post their
report online is not a satisfying alternative either. Even if all companies
wanted to report on their website, the accessibility of these webpages in the
future is a concern. This can be avoided with a public database that features
documents in a more permanent format.
Besides enhancing the
comparability of benefit reports,331 it would strengthen the role of liability
for intentional misrepresentations, since such documents are usually more
easily admissible in court.332
This system obviously entails a certain cost for the states. Different ways
to offset these costs include charging a higher filing fee333 or cooperation
with private parties such as B Lab.334 States could also save costs by
adapting their existing databases or simply creating a different webpage and
posting the reports there, as Minnesota did.
2. Sanctioning Noncompliance
Besides mandating filing of the benefit report with the secretary of
state’s office and publishing the reports in a database, states should create
real sanctions for the failure to send the reports. In this section, I suggest a
set of potential sanctions.
First, the traditional method of imposing fines as sanctions could be
used.335 Additionally, noncompliant benefit corporations may be sanctioned
with the retraction of all tax advantages given by the state. Although such

330. Interestingly, the average time was shorter for respondents contacted through regular mail
(twenty-nine days on average) than those respondents contacted via email (thirty-four days on average).
331. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50–51.
332. MARK BAGNOLI ET AL., NOT ALL CSR REPORTS ARE CREATED EQUAL: REPORT QUALITY AND
VOLUNTARY THIRD-PARTY ASSURANCE 1 (Purdue U. Krannert Graudate Sch. of Mgmt., 2016) (stating
that pdf files are accepted as evidence in American courts, whereas regular webpages are not), http://
www.krannert.purdue.edu/academics/Accounting/bkd_speakers/papers/BHW.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F7
V-WKMM].
333. See infra Appendix I for the fees that are currently charged. After all, by publishing these
reports on a publicly accessible forum, the state helps the branding and marketing purposes sought by
social entrepreneurs.
334. This kind of public service by B Lab could be even more warranted in light of its partial funding
(between one million and five million dollars) by the United States Agency for International
Development.
See Our Funders, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/the-non-profit nonprofit-behind-b-corps/our-funders (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
335. Currently, Rhode Island is the only state imposing fines. It imposes a twenty-five dollars per
report filed late. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-13(f) (2016). See also Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at
48 (suggesting fines).
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tax advantages are not yet widespread336 and most literature has focused on
removing disadvantages for benefit corporations,337 it seems likely that other
states will consider doing this to try to win the competition for benefit
corporation charters.338 Tax advantages would be given because of the social
mission of benefit corporations and would not be warranted if benefit
corporations are not complying with transparency requirements. Repetitive
noncompliance could also be sanctioned with administrative dissolution,339

336. The only advantage for benefit corporations as such is the California Benefit Corporation
Discount applicable to California Benefit Corporations who are in good standing. The discount takes the
form of a four-percent adjustment of bids made by Benefit Corporations for the purposes of determining
the highest ranked bid when bidding for city contracts. S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE, CAL. BENEFIT CORP
DISCOUNT ORDINANCE § 14C.3.
337. In particular, authors have focused on the competitive disadvantage for benefit corporations
compared to tax-exempt nonprofits because they would only be able to deduct a maximum of ten percent
of their taxable income as a charitable contribution. See IRC § 170 (b). See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 61,
at 308 (advocating for a ‘benefit expense’ as a way to offer an unlimited deduction for charitable expenses
made by benefit corporations); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387, 439 (2013) (suggesting a softening of the distinction between charitable donations
and business expenses). Finally, a general information letter by the IRS addressed exactly this issue and
clarified that charitable contributions made by benefit corporations in order to generate goodwill usually
fall under the (completely deductible) category of business expenses. I.R.S. Gen. In. Ltr. 2016-0063
(June 2, 2016).
338. While B Lab stresses on its website that the benefit corporation statutes have no tax impact, in
light of their more ambitious goal to make all companies adopt a benefit corporation governance model,
see supra note 34, it seems likely that they will advocate for such advantages in the future. Some have
reported that B Lab has already advocated for such advantages in the past. See S. Banking & Fin. Inst.
Comm. Hearing, supra note 45, at 8 (comments of the Nonprofit and Unincorporated Organizations
Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar). Different authors have also argued for
favorable tax treatment of benefit corporations. See, e.g., Thornsberry, supra note 81, at 186 (suggesting
a tax break for benefit corporations); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 337, at 439–41 (suggesting “tax
benefits for hybrids as hybrids”); Minhas, Enhancing the Legal and Regulatory Environment for
Investment in Social Enterprises, 3 MICH. J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL L. 257, 274
(advocating for “tax incentives for hybrid/for-profit entities”). Other authors indicated that tax
advantages will likely be adopted in the near future. See, e.g., Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against
For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819, 822 (2012). I do not make a substantive judgment about
new tax advantages for social enterprises. See generally Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for
For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007) (arguing that tax advantages should not be based on
the for-profit or nonprofit form, but on the social benefit created by the entity). But see Leff, supra note
338, at 822 (defending the current state of the law).
339. This sanction already exists in New Hampshire without the repetitive element, see N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13. V, and is part of the current version of the Alaska Bill, see HB 124, 30th Leg.,
2nd Sess. (Alaska 2017), and Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 48, suggested its adoption.
However, caution is recommended when it comes to the interplay of this sanction and the supermajority
requirement to convert to a regular corporation. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 47–48
(warning that the penalty of revoking the benefit corporation status (existing in Minnesota) may be used
to avoid the supermajority requirement to convert to a regular corporation). Murray also notes that the
possibility of shareholders getting a fair value for their shares in the case of intentional noncompliance
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but the severe effects on legal certainty warrant certain leniency measures.
For instance, benefit corporations should first receive a notice alerting them
that they have not complied with the requirement.340 This is particularly
relevant because most benefit corporations are in a startup phase, making it
harder to comply with corporate formalities. For example, sixty-six of the
106 (62%) of all non-converted Oregon benefit companies have received a
late-annual-report notice at least once.341
D. EXCEPTIONS
Only mandating public reporting and actually enforcing this would
arguably create a new problem. It is very likely that a lot of companies that
did not comply will change their status if they are faced with actual
enforcement. More importantly, some entrepreneurs may be deterred from
forming benefit corporations in the future. However, to create a valuable
benefit corporation brand, there needs to be a large pool of such corporations
that comply with the legal requirements. Some of the reasons for
noncompliance that were apparent from the data warrant exceptions to the
reporting obligation.
1. Startups: Comply or Explain Provision
In states with low reporting rates, a high percentage of the analyzed
companies did not convert to a benefit corporation, which suggests that many
benefit corporations are new businesses.342 This indication has been
confirmed by a couple of respondents who spontaneously explained that the
reason for the absence of a report was the early stage of the launching of their
business.343 The fact that the reporting rate in Oregon is significantly higher

will probably remain theoretic due to the difficulty in proving intent. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301
subdiv. 5–7.
340. Compare this with the template to comply with reporting requirement in Minnesota, which
mentions “Notice: Failure to file this form by March 31 of this year will result in the revocation of the
corporation’s public benefit status without further notice from the Secretary of State, pursuant to
Minnesota Statutes, Section 304A.301.” OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149.
341. Seventeen of these sixty-six benefit companies were at some point effectively dissolved and
have filed for reinstatement. Filing for reinstatement costs $100. How to Reinstate an Oregon
Corporation, NORTHWEST REGISTERED AGENT, http://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/reinstaterevive-oregon-corporation.html [https://perma.cc/3U8P-4MHY].
342. Eighty-one percent in Oregon (107/133), eighty-four percent in Colorado (16/19), seventy-five
percent in Delaware (121/161). See Appendices II.b, III.b, and V.b. Compare this with sixty-one percent
in Minnesota (22/36).
343. See supra notes 285-86.
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among converted companies,344 possibly suggests that startups have more
difficulties complying with the public reporting requirement.
The compliance-cost issue for startups requires balancing certain
conflicting interests. On the one hand, public reporting is crucial to holding
benefit corporations accountable, which is of utmost importance to protect
third-parties and to make this corporate entity viable.345 On the other hand,
startups have limited means and a high mortality rate.346 Because of the
difficult-to-meet supermajority requirements for conversion,347 startups will
continue to be the main source of new benefit corporations.348 Because the
benefit corporation brand cannot survive without adopters, the needs of
startups must be considered. At the same time, completely exempting them
from reporting requirements may well erode the benefit corporation brand.
The trick is to find the right balance between exempting startups from
(publicly) reporting in their first few years and providing them with no
exceptions. One option is including an opt-out rule for newly incorporated
benefit corporations. For example, benefit corporations might be allowed to
postpone reporting in the first three years after incorporation, providing that
they explain why they are doing so. Making benefit corporations explain in
cases that do not comply would also discourage existing businesses planning
to convert to benefit corporations from liquidating and reincorporating to
escape reporting requirements.
2. No exception for small companies
I would not advocate for the creation of a similar opt-out exception for
344. Fifty-two percent versus six percent. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Part I.1.2.
346. See Office of Advocacy, supra note 201 (noting that between 2004 and 2014, on average, 78.5%
of new businesses survived one year but also that survival rates after five years ranged from 45.4% to
51.4% — the rate noted for a one-year interval was approximately one-third). All twenty-eight
surrendered, forfeited, and dissolved public benefit corporations and forty-one of the forty-three voided
public benefit corporations in the Delaware data set were incorporated as public benefit corporations.
347. Most states require a two-third majority for conversion to a benefit corporation. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-101-504(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.021 subdiv. 5 and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.103
subdiv. 2; and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §363(a). One exception is Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
60.756 (requiring a simple majority except if the governing documents require a higher threshold).
348. B Lab seems aware of this, since it has dedicated a page of its website specifically to startups.
See Are You a Startup, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/are-you-startup [https://perma.cc/6DCVZMVF]. Note that different authors have argued that the majority of social enterprises (the target of
benefit corporation statutes) are startups. See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 25. See also Walker, supra
note 36, at 29 (predicting that most benefit corporations will be small socially minded startups). See also
Brett R. Smith et al., Social Enterprises and the Timing of Conception: Organizational Identity Tension,
Management, and Marketing, 22 J. NONPROFIT & PUB. SECTOR MKTG. 108, 127 (2010) (finding that
firms that are social enterprises at inception typically suffer less from identity tension).
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small enterprises or microbusinesses.349 The most important policy
consideration motivating this decision is that most benefit corporations are
small and are likely to remain small. Exempting all small benefit
corporations from publishing benefit reports would make public reporting
the exception instead of the rule. These smaller corporations opted in to a
label with a certain marketing value and certain legal protections. The price
they have to pay is accountability and transparency. Not requiring older
smaller enterprises to publish a report would weaken the brand and would
thus give these small enterprises an advantage without requiring them to pay
the price.350
E. OTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE COSTS AND IMPROVE QUALITY
States could adopt six other measures to reduce the costs of reporting
and to increase the value of benefit reports. The advantages of reports with
more informational value is clear given the crucial role of reports in the
accountability and transparency framework.351
First, one of the reasons for low reporting rates seems to be the learning
costs. This factor could be addressed by a range of different measures.
Before incorporation, it seems important to let entrepreneurs make more
informed decisions regarding their entity choice.352 Providing a different
document for the incorporation of benefit corporations seems like an
important first step towards that goal. This could be complemented by
different educational materials, such as brochures and webpages. That
would also remind existing benefit corporations of their legal duties.
Second, states could undoubtedly help benefit corporations to comply
with reporting requirements by providing templates of benefit reports.353
This would lower costs for the companies and probably increase compliance
rates. Obviously, one size does not fit all. The template, however, would be
optional to use and could include space for benefit corporations to customize
it to their own needs.
Third, states should provide a deadline for the publication of the benefit
reports.
Both shareholders and other stakeholders should receive
349. But see Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50 (advocating for an exception or a scaling for
small and/or young enterprises).
350. See Yockey, supra note 137, at 821 (in general about nonreporting firms reaping the aura
without real sanction for greenwashing).
351. See supra Section I.
352. See supra notes 281-82, and accompanying text.
353. Minnesota’s Secretary of State’s Office already provides such a template, see OFF. OF THE
MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149. Other states could follow this template and adapt it to their
needs.
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information on a timely basis. Currently, a lot of different bills provide a
deadline for submission to shareholders but not for publication on the
website (or making it available to the public).354 One option would be to do
as the Kansas legislature has very recently done, expressly stating that the
posting should happen concurrently with the submission to shareholders.355
If the statute requires filing of the report, it could simply provide a yearly
deadline.356
Fourth, no state currently has a provision allowing for consolidation of
benefit reports for benefit corporations who are part of corporate groups.357
Thus, these benefit corporations each have to publish their own benefit
report, creating an additional cost potentially penalizing benefit corporations
who want to expand. It would be advisable to include a provision giving the
opportunity to benefit corporations who have subsidiary benefit corporations
to publish a consolidated benefit report, comparable to consolidated financial
statements.358
Finally, a measure that would enhance the value of public reporting is
the approach of the Hawaiian benefit corporation statute — requiring the
report to be made available for public commenting before finalizing it.359
Including this public-comment requirement would be an effective way to
give outside stakeholders a voice about the impact of benefit corporations.360
CONCLUSION
Public reporting is a crucial element of current benefit corporation
statutes. First, it is necessary to hold benefit corporations accountable for
their public purpose. This is pivotal in view of the objective to create a legal
entity that signals the reliability of the company’s social and environmental
354. See Appendix I.
355. New Sec. 6(e), HB 2697, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2016).
356. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.301.A.1 (“before each April 1”).
357. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 56 (mentioning that there is no provision for
consolidation and citing William Clark who agreed that there was no exception for subsidiaries under the
MBCL).
358. My sample included different benefit corporations that were part of a group structure. One
Delaware public benefit corporation, People Against Dirty, PBC, has at least two subsidiaries which are
public benefit corporations. Patagonia Inc., a California benefit corporation, has at least three subsidiaries
who are benefit corporations. In Minnesota, three different public benefit corporations are part of the
same group (Apex).
359. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b).
360. Robert T. Esposito also suggests the Hawaiian statute’s approach in his article, The Social
Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the
United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 712 (2013)
(noting that the Hawaii approach presupposes assessment against a third-party standard).
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responsibility claims to investors, consumers and employees. Secondly,
transparency itself furthers this same goal. Because the benefits in terms of
serving these objectives outweigh the costs, I have argued that public
reporting has a crucial role in the benefit corporation statutes.
Nonetheless, my empirical study of benefit reporting has shown very
low reporting rates in Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware, ranging from eight
percent to fourteen percent. This lack of reporting could create a risk of
state-sanctioned greenwashing and could endanger the sustainability of these
new legal entities. By analyzing some other variables, such as company size,
company age, and third-party certification, I have identified some potential
reasons for these low levels of reporting. In particular, I have highlighted
learning costs, the large amount of startups and small companies, and the
absence of statutory enforcement as important factors.
In Minnesota, compliance with the reporting requirement was perfect for
the active public benefit corporations. The main difference with Oregon,
Colorado, and Delaware is the fact that the Minnesota statute creates a strong
enforcement mechanism, namely, filing of the report with the secretary of
state’s office and revocation of the public benefit corporation status upon a
failure to do so.
In view of these findings, I argue that policy recommendations regarding
public reporting require a fundamental trade-off between enforcement and
sustainability. While perfect enforcement creates a strong brand in terms of
quality, it may limit the quantity too much, endangering the sustainability of
benefit corporations.
Hence, after having recommended that all legislators mandate public
reporting, I have sought to develop a framework of efficient enforcement,
coupled with exceptions that seem warranted in view of the data and the
purpose of the legislators. I recommend mandatory filing of the report with
the secretary of state’s office and publication of the reports by the states in a
permanent form, ideally in a database. Noncomplying companies can be
sanctioned by a combination of fines, retraction of tax advantages and
eventually administrative dissolution. With the aforementioned trade-off in
mind, I suggest a comply-or-explain exception for starting companies in the
first few years after incorporation. Finally, I have made some other
recommendations which could limit the costs and enhance the quality of
reporting.
If states are not prepared to implement some of these changes to support
the promise of increased purpose, accountability and transparency, they
could create a short-term risk of state-sanctioned greenwashing. In the long
run, benefit corporations would not respond to the market needs they were
created to address, which could render this corporate entity unsustainable.
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Appendix I: Overview of benefit corporation statutes
State

In
effect

Frequency

Third-party
standard

Filing with
the secretary
of state

Publication on
website
mandated

Deadline
publication

Sanction for
non-public
reporting

Statute

Model:
Benefit Corporation

X

Annual

Mandatory

Yes

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

Benefit
enforcement
proceeding
(BEP)
(implicit)*

MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS

Arizona
Benefit Corporation

Dec.
31,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, concurrently with
SH

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§
10-2401 – 10-2442
(LexisNexis 2016).

Arkansas
Benefit Corporation

July
18,
2013

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, concurrently with
SH (before
due date of
franchise
tax), $70

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-36-101 –
401 (2016).

California
Benefit Corporation

Jan. 1,
2012

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (explicit)

CAL. CORP. CODE §
14600-14631
(Deering 2016).

Colorado
Public Benefit
Corporation

Apr. 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

No (not even
for
shareholder)

None1

COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 7-101-501 –
101-509 (2016).

Connecticut
Benefit Corporations

Oct. 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

No

BEP (explicit)

Delaware
Public Benefit
Corporation

Aug.
1,
2013

At least
biennial

Optional

No

Optional

No

None

CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN §§ 33-1350 –
33-1364 (West
2016).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
8, §§ 361-368
(West 2016).

1. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative suits
to enforce the obligation to balance stakeholder interests. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–09.
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District of Columbia

May 1,
2013

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, with
mayor,
biennially

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

D.C. Code Ann. §§
29- 1301-01-130401
(West 2016).

Florida
Benefit Corporation

July 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

No

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
607.601 – 607.613
(LexisNexis 2016).

Hawaii
Sustainable
Business
Corporation

July 8,
2011

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

No

BEP (implicit)*
No specific
enforcement
mechanism
(only specific
for
shareholders)
None2

Illinois Benefit
Corporation

Jan. 1,
2013

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

No

BEP (implicit)*

805 ILL. COMP.
STAT. §§ 40/140/5.01 ( West
2016).

Idaho
Benefit Corporation

July 1,
2015

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BP(implicit)*

IDAHO CODE ANN §
30-2001-2013
(West 2016).

Indiana Benefit
Corporation

Jan 1,
2016

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
concurrently
with SH, $10
to 15

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1.3-1-1 to 231.3-10-6
(LexisNexis 2016).

Kansas Public
Benefit Corporation

July 1,
2017

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

None

H.B. 2153

Kentucky Public
Benefit Corporation

July 1,
2017

Annual

Optional

No

Optional

Not explicit

No

H.B. 35

Louisiana
Benefit Corporation

Aug.
1,
2012

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:1801–
12.1832 (LexisNexi
2016).

Massachusetts
Benefit Corporation

Dec.
1,
2012

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, with
annual
report, $75

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

No right to
hold itself out
as benefit
corporation
BEP (implicit)*

MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 156E, §§ 1–16
(LexisNexis 2016).

Maryland Benefit
Corporation

Oct. 1,
2015

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Nothing
explicit

None3

MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & AS’NS §§
5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08
(LexisNexis 2016).

Minnesota
Public Benefit
Corporation

Jan. 1,
2015

Annual

Mandatory
for GBC
Optional for
SPC

Yes, $35,
before April
1

Not required,
state has
database

Before
April 1

Revocation of
public benefit
corporation
status

MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 304A.001 –
304A.301 (West
2016).

2. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative and
direct suits to enforce corporate purposes. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420D(1)–(13).
3. Neither creates benefit enforcement proceeding, nor mentions anything about which suit and
which conditions exist. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AS’NS §§ 5-6C-01–08.

HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 420D-1–
420D-13
(LexisNexis 2016) .
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Montana
Benefit Corporations

Oct. 1,
2015

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (explicit)

MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-1-1401 – 351-1412 (2016).

Nebraska
Benefit Corporation

July
18,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
concurrently
with SH, fee
of $25 ab
2017

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)*

NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-402 –
21-414 (West
2016).

New Hampshire
Benefit Corporation

Jan. 1,
2015

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
concurrently
with SH, fee
$35

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

Administrative
dissolution by
SoS
BEP (implicit)*

N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 293-C:1 –
293-C:13
(LexisNexis 2016).

Nevada
Benefit Corporation

Jan. 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (explicit)

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 78B.01078B.190
(LexisNexis 2016).

New Jersey
Benefit Corporation

March
1,
2011

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
department
of treasury,
together with
SH, $70

Yes, if the
company has
a website but
there is no
alternative

Not explicit

Department
may forfeit
status as
benefit
corporation if
2 years of non
filing + BEP
(implicit)

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
14a:18-1 -14a:8-11
(West 2016).

New York
Benefit Corporation

Feb.
10,
2012

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
together with
SH, $60

Yes, if the
company has
a website but
there is no
alternative

Not explicit

None4

N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW §§ 1701–1709
(LexisNexis 2016).

Oregon
Benefit Companies

Jan. 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Not explicit

BEP(implicit)5

OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60.750 –
60.770 (West
2016).

Pennsylvania
Benefit Corporation

Jan. 1,
2013

Annual

Mandatory

Yes,
concurrently
with SH, $70

Choice
between
publishing on
website and
sending on
request
Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)

Rhode Island Benefit
Corporation

Jan. 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, concurrently with
shareholders, $106

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

Fine of $25
per year if 30
days late
BEP (implicit)

15 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3301-3331
(West 2016).
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
7-5.3-1 – 7-5.3-13
(2016).

South Carolina
Benefit Corporation

June
14,
2012

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, concurrently with
SH, $10

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP(implicit)

4. Neither creates benefit enforcement proceeding, nor mentions anything about which suit and
which conditions exist. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–09.
5. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding, but Section 60.766(1) of the Oregon Revised
Statutes has the same effect as the definition of the benefit enforcement proceeding.
6. Sixty dollars combined with annual report.

S.C. CODE ANN. §§
33-38-110 – 33-38600 (2016).
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Tennessee ForProfit Benefit
Corporation

Jan. 1,
2016

Annual

Optional

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

None7

TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-28-101 to 4828-109 (2016)

Texas Public Benefit
Corporation

Sept.
1,
2017

At least
biennial

Optional

No

Optional

No

None

H.B. 3488

Utah
Benefit Corporation

May
13,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

Yes, when
filing annual
report. Fee
unknown.

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)

UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 16-10b-101 –
16-10b-402
(LexisNexis 2016).

Vermont
Benefit Corporation

July 1,
2011

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP(implicit)

VT. STAT. ANN tit.
11A, §§ 21.01–
21.14 (2016).

Virginia Benefit
Corporation

July 1,
2011

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (implicit)

VA. CODE ANN. §§
13.1-782 to 13.1791 (West 2016).

West Virginia
Benefit corporation

July 1,
2014

Annual

Mandatory

No

Yes, if the
company has
a website

Not explicit

BEP (explicit)

W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31F-1-101 to
31F-5-501
(LexisNexis 2016)

Appendix II: Data Oregon

a)Compliant benefit companies and their reports
Company name- title of report

Number of
employees

Certification

-Date of
incorporation
-Date of
filing for
benefit
corporation
status

Narrative description8

(A) Assess the extent
to which the benefit
company met or
exceeded a third-party
standard that the
benefit company
selected and identified
in the benefit report.

(B) Describe
the process
and rationale
the benefit
company
used to
select or to
change the
third-party
standard
described in
subparagrap
h (A) of this
paragraph.

Equilibrium Capital
Management, Inc.
Benefit Company Report For
2014 Year
Metropolitan Group, L.L.C.
2015 Annual Report

11-50

B
Corporation

- 6/30/2011
- 12/3/2013

Yes

Yes
B Impact Assessment

No9

11-50

B
Corporation

- before
1/1/200110
- 12/24/2013

Yes

Yes
B Impact Assessment

No

3

Neil Kelly Co., Inc
2015 B Corp Narrative

201-500

B
Corporation

- 6/22/1964
- 12/24/2013

Yes

No

4

Green Girl Land Development
Solutions LLC

1-10

No

- 12/26/2013
- 12/26/2013

Yes

No
But Certified B
Corporation
Yes

1

2

7. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative suits
to enforce balancing of stakeholder interests. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101–09.
8. See Section 60.768(2)(a) of the Oregon Revised Statutes for the prescriptions regarding this
narrative description.
9. Explains the meaning of the standard but not the rationale or the process behind the choice.
10. Precise incorporation date not available on secretary-of-state office’s website.

Yes
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B Impact
Assessment11
1-10

Green
America

-12/31/2013
-12/31/2013

Yes

Yes
Green America

Yes

11-50

B
Corporation

-3/04/2002
-12/31/2013

Yes

No
But Certified B
Corporation

No

7

Canvas Dreams, LLC
Sustainability Metrics12

1-10

B
Corporation

-04/08/2005
-1/2/2014

Yes

No13
But Certified B
Corporation

Yes

8

Gladrags Sustainable
Women’s Health, LLC
Annual Benefit Report 2015

1-10

B
Corporation

-02/22/2011
-1/2/2014

Yes

Yes
B Lab Impact
Assessment

No

9

Freeroot Ventures Inc.
2015 Benefit Company Report

11-50

B
Corporation

-2/18/2010
-1/2/2014

Yes

Yes
B Lab Impact
Assessment

Yes

10

Immix Law Group PC
Immix Law Annual B Corp
Report -2016

11-50

B
Corporation

-3/22/2011
-1/2/2014

Yes

No
But Certified B
Corporation

No

11

Ingenuity Innovation Center,
LLC
2015 Transparency Benefit
Report

1-10

No

-11/13/2012
-1/2/2014

Yes

Yes
B Lab Impact
Assessment

No

12

Beau Delicious! International,
LLC
Oregon’s First Benefit
Company 2015 Report

51-200

B
Corporation

-8/16/2005
-1/6/2014

Yes

No

No

13

Celilo Group Media, Inc.
Benefit Company Report 2015

11-50

B
Corporation

-06/05/2003
-1/17/2014

Yes

No

14

Henkels Law LLC
Annual Benefit Company
Report 2015-2016

Unknown

No

-04/03/2014
-04/03/2014

Yes

No14
Use own formula15
But Certified B
Corporation
Yes
B Impact
Assessment16

15

Enso LLC
2015 Year End Benefit Report

Unknown

No

-02/03/2014
-06/19/2014

Yes

No

16

Tony’s Chocolonely, Inc
Tony’s Chocolonely annual
fair report 2014/2015

11-50

B
Corporation

-07/17/2014
-07/17/2014

Yes

Global Reporting
Initiative

11. Literally calls B Lab the standard but shows a score on the B Impact Assessment.
12. The CEO of this company referred to the webpage as being their 2015 benefit report.
13. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact
Assessment.
14. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact
Assessment.
15. Total coupon redemptions x average transaction size.
16. The company also used the Oregon State Bar Sustainable Future Section, Partners in
Sustainability, as a secondary standard but could not use it as a primary standard because the Managing
Member of the firm served on the executive board of the Sustainable Futures Section. See OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 60.750(6)(b)

Yes

No
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17

Hopworks Urban Brewery
LLC
HUB Sustainability Report:
2014

51-200

B
Corporation

-6/9/2006
-7/18-2014

18

Fair Flies, LLC
Annual Benefit Corp
Statement

1-10

No

-11/12/2014
-11/12/2014

19

Catalyst Law, LLC
Annual Benefit Report

1-10

No

-11/17/2014
-11/17/2014

Yes

Yes

No
But Certified B
Corporation

No

B Impact
Assessment*17

No

No

No

b)Data Oregon
−Benefit Reports
Complied on their website
14
4
10
0
0

Total number
INC
LLC
PC
LTD

Complied by sending on
request
5
2
2
1
0

Non-responsive
103
17
86
0
0

Responded no
11
1
9
0
1

Total
133
24.00
107
1
1

−Principal place of business

Number

OR

WA

ID

CA

Total

129

1

1

2

133

−Website

Websites

No websites

Total

Number

57

76

133

Number with benefit reports

19

0

19

Compliance rate

33.33%

0%

14%

17. Fair Flies, LLC, stated that they used the B Corp Handbook (Ryan Honeyman) as a guide and
independent third-party standard. This book does not provide such a standard but does explain the B
Impact Assessment. Thus, Fair Flies relied on an indirect source in explaining a valid third-party
standard.
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Appendix III Data Colorado
a)Complying Colorado public benefit corporations and their reports
Company name- title
of report

Number of
employees

Certification

-Date of
incorporation
-Date of filing
for benefit
corporation
status

The ways in which
the public benefit
corporation
promoted the
public benefit
identified in the
articles of
incorporation and
the best interests
of those materially
affected by the
corporation's
conduct;

Any
circumstances
that have
hindered the
public benefit
corporation’s
promotion of the
identified public
benefit and the
best interests of
those materially
affected by the
corporation’s
conduct

The process and
rational for
selecting or
changing the
third-party
standard used to
prepare the
benefit report

An assessment of the
overall social and
environmental
performance of the
public benefit
corporation against a
third-party standard

Vention Resources,
Inc., PBC
PBC Annual Report

1-10

No

-7/8/2014
-7/8/2014

Yes

Yes

No

No

Jason Wiener, P.C.,
a Public Benefit
Corporation
2015 Public Benefit
Report

1-10

B
Corporation

-1/12/2014
-8/10/2014

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

b)Data Colorado
−Benefit Reports
Complied on website

Complied by
sending on request

No report on website

Non responsive

Total

Number

1

1

7

10

19

Percentage

5%

5%

37%

53%

−Principal place of business
Number

CO
18

TX
1

Total
19

−Website
Website
Number
Number with benefit reports
Compliance rate

Websites
10
1
10%

No websites
9
1
11.11%

Appendix IV Data Minnesota
−Benefit Reports
Reports available online
Number

36

Compliant

36

Compliance percentage

100%

Total
17
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−Principal place of business
Minnesota
35

Number

Iowa
1

−Website
Websites

No websites

Total

Number

27

9

36

% with website

75%

25%

Appendix V Data Delaware
a)Voluntary reporting public benefit corporations and their reports
Company nametitle of report

Number
of
employees

Certification

-Date of
incorporation
-Date of filing
for benefit
corporation
status

(1) The
objectives the
board of
directors has
established to
promote such
public benefit or
public benefits
and interests;

(2) The standards
the board of
directors has
adopted to
measure the
corporation's
progress in
promoting such
public benefit or
public benefits and
interests

(3) Objective factual
information based
on those standards
regarding the
corporation's
success in meeting
the objectives for
promoting such
public benefit or
public benefits and
interests

(4) An assessment of
the corporation's
success in meeting
the objectives and
promoting such public
benefit or public
benefits and interests

1

Alter Eco
Americas PBC
2015 Full Circle
Sustainability
Impact Report

11-50

B
Corporation
Green
America

- 4/19/2004
- 8/1/2013

Yes

Yes
B Impact
Assessment

Yes

Yes

2

Exemplar
Companies, PBC
2013-2014
Exemplar’s First
Annual Benefit
Report
Grassroots
Capital
Management
Corp., PBC19
Annual Benefit
Report 2015
Plum PBC
Mission report
2015

11-50

No

- 4/13/2007
- 8/1/2013

Yes

Yes

Yes

1-10

B
Corporation

- 10/5/2007
- 8/1/2013

Yes

Yes
B Impact
Assessment
Own Key
Performance
Indicators18
Yes
B Impact
Assessment

Yes

Yes

51-200

B
Corporation

-12/18/’08
-8/1/2013

Yes

Yes
B Impact
Assessment

Yes

Yes

Raven + Lily PBC
Community Give
Back Impact For
2016
Handup PBC
Our Impact in
2016

1-10

B
Corporation

-8/1/2013
-8/1/2013

Yes

No
But Certified B
Corporation

Yes

No

1-10

No

-8/21/2013
-8/21/2013

Yes

No

No

Yes

3

4

5

6

18. Also used their own ‘Key Performance Indicators,’ because they are disappointed with the way
B Lab evaluates their impact. They don’t feel like their improvements are visible.
19. Expressly targeted at stakeholders.
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Global Uprising,
PBC
Benefit
Corporation
Report
Rescue Social
Change Group,
PBC
Benefit
Corporation
Report 2016

11-50

B
Corporation

-10/2/2013
-10/2/2013

Yes

No20
But Certified B
Corporation

Yes

Yes

51-200

B
Corporation

-7/14/2014
-7/14/2014

Yes

Yes
B Lab Impact
Assessment

Yes

Yes

Potluck Energy,
PBC.
Benefit
Corporation21
2014 Annual
Report
Altschool, PBC
2016 Benefit
Corporation
Report
EA Engineering,
Science, and
Technology, Inc.
PBC
2014-2015
Corporate Social
Responsibility
Report and Public
Benefit
Corporation
Statement
Beanfields, PBC
Beanfields 2015
BPC Statement

1-10

No

-8/12/2014
-8/12/2014

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

51-200

B
Corporation

-12/27/2011
-10/8/2014

Yes

Yes
B Lab Impact
Assessment

Yes

Yes

201-500

No

-9/11/1986
-12/12/’14

Yes

Yes,
Global Reporting
Initiative

Yes

Yes

11-50

B
Corporation
Green
America
No

-12/19/14
-12/19/14

No

No22
But Certified B
Corporation

Yes

No

-12/19/14
-12/19/14

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Maps Public
Benefit
Corporation
Biennial Special
Purpose
Review23

11-50

b)Data Delaware
−Benefit Reports
Complied on
their website

Complied by
sending on request

Responded
without sending

Non-responsive

Total

Number

12

1

43

105

161

% with benefit reports

7%

1%

27%

65%

20. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact
Assessment.
21. Using Benefit Corporation interchangeably with Public Benefit Corporation.
22. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact
Assessment.
23. This review is a note in the Consolidated Financial Statements of the 100% shareholder of the
PBC, a nonprofit.
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−Principal place of business

Principal place of business Delaware
60
50
40
30
20
10
CA
Unknown
NY
MA
DC
FL
WA
IL
MD
DE
NJ
TX
CO
PA
CT
MI
MN
NV
OR
PR
RI
SC
UT
TN
UT
VA

0

-Website
Websites

No websites

Total

Number

114

47

161

Number with reports

13

0

Reporting rate

11.40%

